The 'in virtue of' relation -- Meaning -- Beyond modality -- The spectre of "two dogmas" -- Definitions -- More arguments against analyticity -- Analytic justification
Summary
The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences (the idea that some sentences are true or false just in virtue of what they mean) is a famous focus of philosophical controversy. Gillian Russell reinvigorates the debate with a new defence of the distinction, showing that it is compatible with semantic externalism
Bibliography
Includes bibliographical references (pages 223-228) and index
Notes
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English
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