| Description |
xi, 328 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm |
| Series |
Interdisciplinary readers in law |
|
Interdisciplinary readers in law.
|
| Contents |
Machine derived contents note: I. Theory of the Firm and Capital Markets -- Theory of the Firm -- Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling -- Transaction Cost Economics, Oliver E. Williamson -- Ownership of the Firm, Henry Hansmann -- Notes and Questions -- Theory of Capital Markets -- From a Random Walk Down Wall Street, Burton G. Malkiel -- From Corporate Finance, Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield, and Jeffrey F. Jaffe -- Notes and Questions -- II. Legal Characteristics of the Corporation: Limited Liability -- Limited Liability and the Corporation, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel -- Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm, Susan E. Woodward -- Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, Henry Hansmann and Reiner H. Kraakman -- Notes and Questions -- III. The Production of Corporate Laws -- State Competition for Corporate Charters -- The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, Roberta Romano -- Toward an Interest Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller -- Notes and Questions -- The Structure of Corporation Laws -- The Corporate Contract, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel -- The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, Jeffrey N. Gordon -- The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, John C. Coffee, Jr. -- Notes and Questions -- IV. Financing the Corporation -- On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, Clifford W. Smith, Jr., and Jerold B. Warner -- Contractual Resolution of Bondholder-Stockholder Conflicts in Leveraged Buyouts, Kenneth Lehn and Annette Poulsen -- Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, Michael C. Jensen -- The Structure and Governance of Venture Capital Organizations, William A. Sahlman -- Two Agency Cost Explanations of Dividends, Frank H. Easterbrook -- Notes and Questions -- V. Internal Governance Structures -- Boards of Directors and Fiduciary Duties -- Corporate Governance, Oliver E. Williamson -- Incentive and Tax Effects of Executive Compensation Plans, Clifford W. Smith and Ross L. Watts -- The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, Roberta Romano -- Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, John C. Coffee, Jr. -- Notes and Questions -- Shareholder Voting Rights and the Exercise of Voice -- Voting in Corporate Law, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel -- Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, Jeffrey N. Gordon -- Proxy Contests and the Efficiency of Shareholder Oversight, John Pound -- A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, Mark Roe -- Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, Bernard S. Black -- Active Investors, LBO's and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, Michael C. Jensen -- Notes and Questions -- VI. External Governance Structures: The Market for Corporate Control -- Theories and Evidence -- Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Henry Manne -- Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, Michael C. Jensen -- Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence H. Summers -- Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers, Yakov Amihud and Baruch Lev -- The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, Richard Roll -- The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback -- The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, and Jeffry M. Netter -- Hostile Takeovers in the 1980's: The Return to Corporate Specialization, Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny -- Notes and Questions -- Management's Fiduciary Duty and Takeover Defenses -- The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel -- Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, Ronald J. Gilson -- The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, Lucian A. Bebchuk -- The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, and Jeffry M. Netter -- The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover Legislation, Jonathan Karpoff and Paul Malatesta -- The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, Roberta Romano -- Notes and Question -- VII. Securities Regulation -- Disclosure Regulation -- Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel -- Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, John C. Coffee, Jr. -- The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, Carol J. Simon -- Notes and Questions -- Insider Trading Regulation -- Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy, Kenneth E. Scott -- The Regulation of Insider Trading, Dennis W. Carlton and Daniel R. Fischel -- Notes and Questions |
| Analysis |
Business Law |
|
United States |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Subject |
Corporate governance -- United States.
|
|
Corporation law -- United States.
|
| Author |
Romano, Roberta.
|
| LC no. |
92034550 |
| ISBN |
0195074122 (acid-free paper) |
|
0195074130 (paperback: acid-free paper) |
|
