| Description |
xxvii, 270 pages ; 24 cm |
| Contents |
Contents note continued: 1.6.7.The need for competition scrutiny diminishes when there is a parallel regulatory regime and intellectual property provides such a regime -- 1.6.8.Compulsory licensing discourages investment in innovation and creativity -- 1.7.The Incomplete Globalisation of Competition Policy -- 2.The Uneasy Cohabitation of Law and Economics in Competition Regimes -- 2.1.Empiricism versus Formalism -- 2.2.The Uneven Reception of Economics across Jurisdictions -- 2.2.1.The rule of reason and economics in United States case law -- 2.2.2.The delayed take-up of economics in Europe -- 2.2.3.Economics legislatively mandated or excluded: Canada, Australia and New Zealand -- 2.3.The Inherent Indeterminism of Economics -- 2.4.Judicial Exits from Indeterminate Economics -- 2.4.1.Deference to the regulator -- 2.4.2.Manipulating the onus and standard of proof -- 2.4.3.Deference to business autonomy or expertise -- 2.5.Modes of Absorbing Economics -- |
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Contents note continued: 2.6.Choosing Between the False Positive and the False Negative -- 3.Fault Lines in Competition Policy -- 3.1.A Taxonomy of Competition Rules -- 3.2.Disentangling Fact and Law in Competition Cases -- 3.2.1.Rules or prophecies? -- 3.2.2.Proof and presumption in competition cases -- 3.3.The Role of Markets in the Refusal to License Debate -- 3.3.1.Defining markets and delimiting rights are not the same thing -- 3.3.2.Substitutability and intellectual property -- 3.3.3.How many markets? How many rights? -- 3.3.4.Special rules for special markets? -- 3.3.5.Standard setting and standard capture -- 3.3.6.Mandated interoperability -- 3.4.Efficiency and Consumers: Centre Stage or at the Margins? -- 3.4.1.Efficiency: goal or fall-back defence? -- 3.4.2.The three faces of efficiency -- 3.4.3.Whose welfare matters? -- 3.5.Probability, Intent and Outcome -- 3.6.The Uncertain Role of Barriers to Entry in Competition Analysis -- 3.6.1.Measurement or categorisation -- |
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Contents note continued: 3.6.2.Structural versus strategic barriers -- 3.7.The Ever-receding Perfect Remedy -- 3.7.1.Remedial objectives in competition cases -- 3.7.2.Structural remedies: nuclear deterrent or conventional weapon? -- 3.7.3.Judicial recoil from the role of quasi regulator -- 3.7.4.Pricing coerced access -- 3.7.5.Court-created supervisory structures: assisting whom---court or regulator? -- 3.7.6.Retrospective assessment of efficacy -- 3.7.7.Reasoning backward from remedy to breach -- 3.7.8.Multi-purpose monetary remedies -- 4.Intellectual Property and Competition Policy: Constructing the Interface -- 4.1.Privilege, Punishment and Neutrality -- 4.2.Winners and Losers in the Intellectual Property Game -- 4.2.1.Innovators, creators and owners -- 4.2.2.Competitors as innovators -- 4.2.3.Users and consumers -- 4.2.4.Dispersed contributors to innovative efficiency -- 4.3.The Magic of Names: ̀Property', ̀Regulation' and ̀Monopoly' -- |
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Contents note continued: 4.3.1.Property's necessary ambiguities -- 4.3.2.Is intellectual property really the same as other property and does it matter? -- 4.3.3.Property versus regulation: a false polarity -- 4.3.4.Legal versus economic monopolies -- 4.4.Slicing the Intellectual Property Pie -- 4.4.1.The juristic form of the right -- 4.4.2.Matching rule to rationale -- 4.4.3.Different jurisdictions slice the pie differently -- 4.4.4.Paracopyright and privatised regulation -- 4.5.Intellectual Property's Lopsided Relationship with Competition Policy -- 4.5.1.Intellectual property's internal competition controls -- 4.5.2.Ranking rights in terms of utility and vulnerability -- 4.5.3.One size fits all -- 4.5.4.Intellectual property and barriers to entry -- 4.6.The Contested Economics of Intellectual Property -- 4.6.1.The economics of rights justification -- 4.6.2.The economics of rights expansion -- 4.6.3.Cheering on the expansion -- 4.6.4.Worried bystanders and prophets of doom -- |
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Contents note continued: 4.7.The Erosion of Intellectual Property's Own Limiting Mechanisms -- 4.7.1.Towards the fully protectable idea -- 4.7.2.Cutting the link between signifier and reputation -- 4.7.3.Effort and investment protected per se -- 4.7.4.Widening the copyright infringement net -- 4.7.5.Restricting follow-on innovation and creativity -- 4.8.Pushing at the Time/Space Envelope -- 4.8.1.Extending the term of the right -- 4.8.2.Towards the inexhaustible right -- 4.8.3.Exporting over-protection -- 5.Refusals to License in the United States -- 5.1.The Fragmentation of United States Monopolisation Law -- 5.2.The Push-Me-Pull-You Intellectual Property---Antitrust Relationship -- 5.3.The Interrupted Journey Towards Regulatory Neutrality -- 5.4.The Right to Refuse and Essential Facilities in United States Antitrust Law -- 5.4.1.Expansion and refinement of the essential facilities doctrine -- 5.4.2.The Colgate principle -- 5.4.3.The significance of fair dealing -- |
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Contents note continued: 5.4.4.The Trinko retreat: squeezing the life out of essential facilities -- 5.5.The Continuing Problem of Constructive Refusal and Margin Squeeze -- 5.6.Spare Parts and After Markets: A Dead End? -- 5.7.Variation across the Intellectual Property Spectrum: Uneven Treatment of Patents and Copyright -- 5.8.Parallel Jurisprudence on Abuse of Rights -- 5.9.The Uncertain Line between Action and Inaction in US Law -- 5.10.A Summary of Judicial Responses to Refusals to License in United States Courts -- 6.Europe's Exceptional Circumstances Test -- 6.1.Soft and Hard Law in Europe -- 6.2.Hallmarks of European Refusals Jurisprudence -- 6.2.1.The nexus between market power and ownership of intellectual property right -- 6.2.2.Close and enduring embrace of the essential facilities doctrine -- 6.2.3.Leveraging theory and the multiple markets debate in Europe -- 6.2.4.Entrenchment of the need for objective justification -- 6.3.Refusals to Supply Tangibles -- |
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Contents note continued: 6.4.Refusals to Supply Intangibles -- 6.5.Refusals to License Intellectual Property -- 6.5.1.The emergence of the concept of exceptional circumstances -- 6.5.2.Judicial refinement of the concept of exceptionality -- 6.5.3.National treatment of refusals to license intellectual property -- 6.6.Oscar Bronner. Anomaly or Path Through the Woods? -- 6.7.Euro Microsoft -- 6.8.Little Guidance from the Guidance -- 7.Refusals to License in Australia and New Zealand: Parsing the Hints and Silences -- 7.1.Convergence and its Limits -- 7.2.Taking Advantage of Market Power -- 7.2.1.The statutory provisions -- 7.2.2.Australia: many roads home -- 7.2.3.New Zealand: one test to rule them all -- 7.3.Feeding Intellectual Property into the Legislative Mix -- 7.3.1.The legislated line between action and inaction in relation to intellectual property in Australia and New Zealand -- 7.3.2.Judicial hints and silences in Australia -- |
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Contents note continued: 7.3.3.A New Zealand oddity: section 36(3) of the Commerce Act -- 7.3.4.Restraint of trade and breach of confidence preserved by statute -- 8.Canada: Legislative Solutions and Regulatory Bypasses -- 8.1.A Three Pronged Legislative Assault -- 8.2.Enforcement and Adjudication -- 8.3.Section 75: Refusals to Deal -- 8.4.Section 79: General and Specific Prohibitions -- 8.5.Section 32: Special Remedies for Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights -- 8.6.The Patent Assignment Cases -- 8.7.The Competition Bureau's Enforcement Guidelines -- 8.7.1.Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines (2000) -- 8.7.2.Draft Enforcement Guidelines on Abuse of Dominance -- 8.8.Compulsory Licensing Under Intellectual Property Statutes in Canada -- 9.Reintegrating Law and Economics: Perfecting the Art of the Possible -- 9.1.The Case for Neutrality Restated -- 9.2.Intellectual Property and Competition Policy: Rebuilding the Interface -- 9.2.1.Setting limits to competition policy -- |
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Contents note continued: 9.2.2.The inadequacy of intellectual property's internal controls -- 9.2.3.The choices for courts and regulators -- 9.3.Failed Black-Letter Exits from the Refusal to License Impasse -- 9.3.1.Essential facilities, the right to refuse and exceptional circumstances: non-solutions to non-problems -- 9.3.2.The ranking of rights: unworkable and distracting -- 9.4.The Perils of Legislative Intervention -- 9.5.The Shifting of Competition Law's Internal Markers -- 9.6.Reducing the Empirical Deficit |
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Machine generated contents note: 1.Framing the Analysis -- 1.1.The Nature of the Problem -- 1.2.The Scheme of the Book -- 1.3.The Distractions of Terminology -- 1.3.1.̀Intellectual property', ̀intellectual property right' and ̀refusal to license' -- 1.3.2.̀Regulator' and ̀regulation' -- 1.3.3.̀Competition', ̀antitrust', ̀abuse of market power' and ̀monopolisation' -- 1.4.Two Bad Ideas Converge -- 1.5.The Ideal Competition Regime -- 1.6.Rhetorical Dead Ends and Red Herrings -- 1.6.1.Ownership carries with it the right to exclude others from the thing owned -- 1.6.2.What the State has expressly granted it shall not take back by stealth -- 1.6.3.Intellectual property owners must be free to choose their licensees -- 1.6.4.Coerced licensing is confiscation -- 1.6.5.Regulatory intervention is justified only in the case of marginal or weak intellectual property rights -- 1.6.6.Under-regulation is always and everywhere better than over-regulation -- |
| Summary |
Economic analysis rarely appears on the judicial horizon in intellectual property litigation. In competition cases, by contrast, economists are familiar figures in the courtroom and the language of economics is scattered throughout the judgments of even the highest courts. One might expect, therefore, that refusals to license intellectual property would generate the same fruitful symbiosis between law and economics when those refusals surface in competition proceedings. This however, has not been how the law on this subject has developed in most jurisdictions. Courts and enforcement agencies faced with a unilateral refusal to license have instead tended to retreat into sketchily articulated black letter rules and presumptions which then have to be fenced off from the rest of competition law by economically irrelevant qualifications and distinctions based on private law categorisations of, and rationales for, individual intellectual property rights. This bypassing of case-by-case analysis in favour of more traditional modes of legal reasoning is not entirely the fault of lawyers. Economists have contributed to this state of affairs by urging judges and regulators to convert empirically undernourished theories about the proper role of intellectual property in a market economy into rules of law and evidentiary presumptions intended to be binding in future cases. How this came about and what it means for the future of effective competition enforcement globally are the twin concerns of this book |
| Analysis |
Australian |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [240]-255) and index |
| Subject |
Antitrust law.
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Intellectual property -- Economic aspects.
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Intellectual property.
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License agreements.
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| Author |
Longdin, Louise.
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| LC no. |
2012382238 |
| ISBN |
1841138738 (paperback) |
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9781841138732 (paperback) |
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