| Description |
xxvii, 991 pages : illustrations, tables, graphs ; 25 cm |
| Contents |
Contents note continued: 10.4.2.The Dominant-Shareholder Revision -- 10.5.Why are There Firms?---and Why is There More Than One? -- 10.5.1.Transaction Costs -- 10.5.2.Information -- 10.5.3.Vertical Integration -- 10.5.4.Diversification -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problem -- 11.Mergers -- 11.1.Introduction -- 11.2.Merger Waves -- 11.2.1.First: Turn of the 19th Century -- 11.2.2.Second: The Roaring 20s -- 11.2.3.Third and Fourth: The Conglomerate 60s and the UnConglomerate 80s -- 11.2.4.Fifth: Turn of the 20th Century -- 11.2.5.Common Themes -- 11.3.Horizontal Mergers -- 11.3.1.A Cournot Model -- 11.3.2.Empirical Evidence -- 11.4.The Market for Corporate Control -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- 12.Interfirm Contracts -- 12.1.Introduction -- 12.2.Contracts: Determinants and Effects -- 12.2.1.Transaction Costs -- 12.2.2.Monitoring and Incentives -- 12.2.3.Vertical Separation -- 12.3.Vertical Contracts -- 12.3.1.Exclusive Territories -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.3.2.Exclusive Dealing -- 12.3.3.Tying -- 12.3.4.Resale Price Maintenance -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problem -- pt. IV Applications -- 13.Advertising, Information, and Sales -- 13.1.Introduction -- 13.2.Models of Advertising -- 13.2.1.Monopoly Advertising: The Dorfman-Steiner Condition -- 13.2.2.Goodwill -- 13.2.3.Advertising and Entry (I) -- 13.2.4.Advertising and Welfare -- 13.3.Empirical Evidence -- 13.3.1.Advertising Impact -- 13.3.2.Informative Advertising -- 13.3.3.Advertising as a Signal -- 13.3.4.Persuasive Advertising -- 13.3.5.Advertising and Entry (II) -- 13.4.Advertising Competition in Oligopoly -- 13.4.1.Crackers! -- 13.5.Sales -- 13.5.1.Second-Degree Price Discrimination -- 13.5.2.Durable Goods -- 13.5.3.Retailer Inventories -- 13.5.4.Fashion -- 13.5.5.Consumer Shopping Behaviour -- 13.5.6.Strategic -- 13.5.7.Recapitulation -- 13.6.Price Dispersion -- 13.6.1.Online Book Market -- 13.6.2.Experimental Evidence -- |
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Contents note continued: 16.7.3.Dumping -- 16.7.4.What is to Be Done? -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 17.Market Integration in the European Union -- 17.1.Introduction -- 17.2.Market Integration in Theory -- 17.2.1.Market Integration and Market Performance -- 17.2.2.Imperfect Competition -- 17.2.3.Market Integration and Market Structure -- 17.3.Market Integration in Practice -- 17.3.1.Price Dispersion -- 17.3.2.Market Structure -- 17.3.3.Intra-EU Trade -- 17.3.4.Market Performance -- 17.3.5.Resume -- 17.4.State Aid in the EU and EU State Aid Policy -- 17.4.1.The Extent of State Aid -- 17.4.2.Types of Aid -- 17.4.3.The Application of State Aid Policy -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- pt. V Antitrust and Competition Policy -- 18.U.S. Antitrust: Background -- 18.1.Introduction -- 18.2.Roads, Canals, and Regional Railroads -- 18.2.1.Roads -- 18.2.2.Canals -- 18.2.3.Regional Railroads -- 18.3.A National Railroad System -- |
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Contents note continued: 18.4.Backlash -- 18.4.1.Farm -- 18.4.2.Labour -- 18.4.3.Small Business -- 18.5.Public Debate -- 18.5.1.Competition Here, Combination There -- 18.5.2.Potential Competition -- 18.6.The Sherman Act -- 18.6.1.Senate Debates -- 18.6.2.Much Ado About Nothing? -- 18.7.The Progressive Movement, the Clayton Act and the FTC Act -- 18.7.1.Continued Debate -- 18.7.2.The Progressive Movement -- 18.7.3.The Clayton Act and the FTC Act -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Appendix: Nuts and Bolts -- 19.EU Competition Policy: Background -- 19.1.Introduction -- 19.2.Historical National Approaches -- 19.2.1.UK -- 19.2.2.Germany -- 19.2.3.France -- 19.2.4.Elsewhere in Europe -- 19.2.5.Abuse Control and Post-war German Competition Policy -- 19.3.The European Coal and Steel Community -- 19.3.1.The Schuman Plan -- 19.3.2.Epilogue -- 19.4.EC Competition Policy -- 19.4.1.The Spaak Report -- 19.4.2.EC Treaty -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- |
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Contents note continued: 2.2.4.Long-run Perfectly Competitive Equilibrium -- 2.2.5.Rent and Quasi-rent -- 2.3.Monopoly -- 2.3.1.Equilibrium -- 2.3.2.Deadweight Welfare Loss -- 2.3.3.Measuring Market Performance -- 2.3.4.Lemer Index of Market Power -- 2.3.5.Single Supplier with Possible Entry -- 2.3.6.Rent Seeking and Other Costs of Market Power -- 2.4.Evidence From Laboratory Markets -- 2.4.1.Background -- 2.4.2.Experimental Market Demand and Supply -- 2.4.3.Double Auction Competitive Markets -- 2.4.4.Posted-offer Competitive Markets -- 2.4.5.Double Auction Monopoly Markets -- 2.4.6.Posted-offer Monopoly Markets -- 2.5.Evidence from Naturally Occurring Markets -- 2.5.1.Deadweight Loss and Rent Seeking -- 2.5.2.Rent Sharing -- 2.5.3.Inefficiency -- 2.5.4.Distributional Effects -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 3.Oligopoly I Basic Models -- 3.1.Introduction -- 3.2.Cournot Oligopoly -- 3.2.1.The Basic Model -- 3.2.2.Best-response Functions -- |
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Contents note continued: 21.3.6.Article 102 Things to Come? -- 21.4.Microsoft -- 21.4.1.U.S. -- 21.4.2.EU -- Summary -- Study Points -- Discussion Topics -- Further Reading -- 22.Merger Policy -- 22.1.Introduction -- 22.2.United States -- 22.2.1.The Original Clayton Act Section 7 -- 22.2.2.Celler-Kefauver -- 22.2.3.Caselaw: there and back again -- 22.2.4.Merger Guidelines -- 22.2.5.Harm to Competition---Damage to Market Performance -- 22.3.European Union -- 22.3.1.Before the MCR -- 22.3.2.The Merger Control Regulation -- 22.3.3.Market Definition -- 22.3.4.de Havilland -- 22.3.5.Joint Dominance -- 22.3.6.Schneider/Legrand -- 22.3.7.Tetra Laval/Sidel -- 22.3.8.Institutional Reform and the More Economic Approach to Merger Control -- 22.4.Transatlantic Disagreement -- 22.4.1.Antitrust -- 22.4.2.Competition Policy -- 22.5.Merger Remedies -- 22.5.1.FTC Study -- 22.5.2.DG Competition Study -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problem -- |
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Contents note continued: 23.Public Policy Toward Price Discrimination -- 23.1.Introduction -- 23.2.U.S. Antitrust -- 23.2.1.Predatory Price Discrimination -- 23.2.2.Protecting Small Grocers -- 23.2.3.Interpretation and Reinterpretation -- 23.3.EU Competition Policy -- 23.3.1.Article 101 -- 23.3.2.Article 102 United Brands -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- 24.Vertical Restraints -- 24.1.Introduction -- 24.2.Antitrust Policy Toward Vertical Contracts -- 24.2.1.Resale Price Maintenance (I) -- 24.2.2.Non-price Vertical Restraints -- 24.2.3.Exclusive Dealing, Requirements, and Tying Contracts -- 24.2.4.Resale Price Maintenance (II) -- 24.2.5.Primary Concern of Antitrust Law -- 24.3.Competition Policy Toward Vertical Contracts -- 24.3.1.Consten & Grundig -- 24.3.2.Metro I -- 24.3.3.Dutch Books -- 24.3.4.British Books -- 24.3.5.Regulations and Guidelines -- 24.3.6.Motor Vehicles -- Summary -- Study Points -- Discussion Topics -- Further Reading -- |
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Contents note continued: 25.Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Intellectual Property -- 25.1.Introduction -- 25.2.Antitrust and (or versus?) Intellectual Property -- 25.2.1.Standard-Setting Organizations (SSOs), Patent Trolls, and Hold up -- 25.2.2.Licensing (or Not): Intel -- 25.2.3.Cross-Licensing and Patent Pools -- 25.2.4.Patents and Tying -- 25.3.Intellectual Property Rights and Article 102 -- 25.3.1.Pharmaceuticals -- 25.3.2.IBM Settlement (1984) -- 25.3.3.Hilti -- 25.3.4.Tetra Pak Rousing -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problem -- 26.Are Antitrust and Competition Policy Worth it? -- 26.1.Introduction -- 26.2.The 25-year Cycle -- 26.2.1.Before the Sherman Act -- 26.2.2.Before the Clayton and FTC Acts -- 26.2.3.Post-World War I -- 26.2.4.Between the World Wars -- 26.2.5.Post-World War II -- 26.2.6.The 1980s -- 26.2.7.Early 21st Century -- 26.2.8.Recurring Themes -- 26.3.Costs and Benefits of Competition -- 26.3.1.Concentration -- 26.3.2.Entry and Exit -- |
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Contents note continued: 26.3.3.Innovation -- 26.3.4.Rivalry -- 26.3.5.Losses from Competition -- 26.4.Costs and Benefits of Antitrust and Competition Policy -- 26.4.1.Costs -- 26.4.2.Benefits -- 26.5.Competition Policy in a Market Economy -- Further Reading -- Appendix I Industry Classification Schemes -- 1.1.Introduction -- 1.2.U.S. -- 1.3.EU -- Appendix II Just the Math Used in this Book -- 11.1.Slope -- 11.1.1.Of a Smooth Curve -- 11.2.Minimum and Maximum -- 11.3.Rules for Finding Derivatives -- 11.3.1.Derivative of a Polynomial -- 11.3.2.Derivatives of Products and Quotients -- 11.4.Price Elasticity and Marginal Revenue: Linear Demand -- 11.5.The Chain Rule and the Inverse Function Rule -- 11.5.1.The Chain Rule -- 11.5.2.The Inverse Function Theorem -- 11.6.Monopoly -- 11.6.1.Quantity-setting -- 11.6.2.Price-setting -- 11.7.Systems of Linear Equations -- 11.8.The Mechanics of Discounting |
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Contents note continued: 3.2.3.Cournot Equilibrium -- 3.2.4.Cost Differences -- 3.2.5.Conjectural Variations -- 3.2.6.Many Firms -- 3.3.Bertrand Duopoly -- 3.3.1.Standardized Product -- 3.3.2.Contestable Markets -- 3.3.3.Differentiated Products -- 3.4.Cournot and Bertrand Compared -- 3.5.Markets with Consumer Search -- 3.5.1.Setup -- 3.5.2.Equilibrium -- 3.5.3.Extensions -- 3.5.4.The Incidence of Search in Markets for Perishable Goods -- 3.6.Switching Costs -- 3.7.Network Externalities -- 3.7.1.Direct, Indirect -- 3.7.2.Strategic Possibilities -- 3.8.Platform Markets -- 3.8.1.A Stylized Model of the Market for Credit Cards -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 4.Oligopoly II Address Models -- 4.1.Introduction -- 4.2.Spatial Oligopoly -- 4.2.1.The Emperors of Ice Cream -- 4.2.2.Main Street -- 4.2.3.Ringworld -- 4.3.Vertical Product Differentiation -- 4.3.1.Setup -- 4.3.2.Demand -- 4.3.3.Equilibrium -- 4.3.4.Quality Downshifting -- |
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Contents note continued: 4.4.Horizontal and Vertical Product Differentiation compared -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 5.Oligopoly III Evidence -- 5.1.Introduction -- 5.2.Evidence from Laboratory Markets -- 5.2.1.Cournot Markets -- 5.2.2.Bertrand Markets -- 5.2.3.Contestable Markets -- 5.2.4.Search Markets -- 5.3.Evidence from Naturally Occurring Markets -- 5.3.1.Barriers to Entry -- 5.3.2.Determinants of Entry Conditions -- 5.3.3.Industry Studies (Mostly) -- 5.3.4.Firm-level Evidence -- 5.3.5.Price -- 5.3.6.Persistence of Profit -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- pt. II Conduct -- 6.Collusion: Economics -- 6.1.Introduction -- 6.2.Tacit Collusion -- 6.2.1.Trigger Strategy -- 6.2.2.Uncertainty -- 6.3.Collusion -- 6.3.1.Collusion Cost -- 6.3.2.Illegal Collusion -- 6.4.Factors Affecting Cartel Stability -- 6.4.1.Internal Factors -- 6.4.2.External Factors -- 6.5.Cartels in Practice -- 6.5.1.15th-century European Alum -- |
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Contents note continued: 6.5.2.18th-century English Copper -- 6.5.3.19th-century British Pin Industry Price Associations -- 6.5.4.Pre-Sherman Act U.S. Railroad Cartels -- 6.6.The Effects of Collusion -- 6.6.1.On Market Performance -- 6.6.2.On Market Structure -- 6.6.3.Evidence -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problem -- 7.Dominant Firms -- 7.1.Introduction -- 7.2.Leadership Models -- 7.2.1.A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe -- 7.2.2.Durable Goods Monopoly -- 7.2.3.Quantity Leadership -- 7.2.4.Limit Pricing -- 7.2.5.Dynamic Limit Pricing -- 7.2.6.The Persistence of Leadership? -- 7.3.Predation -- 7.3.1.Predation in "As If" Perfectly Competitive Markets? -- 7.3.2.Episodes of Predation -- 7.3.3.Models of Predation in Imperfectly Competitive Markets -- 7.3.4.Experimental Tests -- 7.4.Raising Rivals' Costs -- 7.4.1.A Stackelberg Leader RRC Model -- 7.4.2.Examples -- 7.5.Strategic Bundling -- 7.5.1.Bundling to Induce Exit -- |
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Contents note continued: 7.5.2.Bundling to Alter Rivals' Conduct -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 8.Price Discrimination -- 8.1.Introduction -- 8.2.Price Discrimination Toward Final Consumers -- 8.2.1.First-Degree Price Discrimination -- 8.2.2.Second-Degree Price Discrimination -- 8.2.3.Third-Degree Price Discrimination -- 8.3.Bundling and Price Discrimination -- 8.3.1.Pure Components -- 8.3.2.Pure Bundling -- 8.3.3.Mixed Bundling -- 8.3.4.Bundling by Cable-TV Systems -- 8.4.Price Discrimination and Market Performance -- 8.4.1.Price Discrimination by a Monopolist Input Supplier -- 8.4.2.Price Discrimination to Support Collusion -- 8.4.3.Postscript -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- pt. III Organization -- 9.Market Structure -- 9.1.Introduction -- 9.2.The Structure of Industries Within the Economy -- 9.3.Supply-Side Market Structure -- 9.3.1.Manufacturing: Description -- 9.3.2.Explanation -- |
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Contents note continued: 9.3.3.Models of Cournot Market Structure -- 9.3.4.Production Scale Economies and Seller Concentration -- 9.3.5.Network Externalities -- 9.3.6.Path Dependence (I) -- 9.3.7.Horizontal Production Differentiation: The Circle Model -- 9.3.8.Empirical Studies of Concentration I: Cross-Section and Industry Studies -- 9.3.9.Chandler -- 9.3.10.Sutton -- 9.3.11.Overall -- 9.3.12.Retail Distribution -- 9.4.The Dynamics of Market Structure -- 9.4.1.Entry and Exit as a Selection Mechanism -- 9.4.2.Turbulence, Turnover, and Mobility -- 9.4.3.Path Dependence (II) -- 9.4.4.Firm Size Distributions -- 9.5.Reconciliation -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 10.Firms and Firm Structure -- 10.1.Introduction -- 10.2.Large Firms -- 10.2.1.Their Presence -- 10.2.2.What to Make of it -- 10.3.Their Rise -- 10.3.1.U.S. -- 10.3.2.EU -- 10.3.3.Backlash -- 10.4.The Separation of Ownership and Control -- 10.4.1.The Berle-Means Analysis -- |
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Contents note continued: Appendix: Nuts and Bolts -- 20.Collusion and Cooperation: Public Policy -- 20.1.Introduction -- 20.2.Hard Core Collusion -- 20.2.1.Sherman Act Section 1 -- 20.2.2.Article 101 (1) -- 20.2.3.Leniency programmes -- 20.3.Facilitating Practices -- 20.3.1.Basing-Point Pricing -- 20.3.2.Trade Association Activities and Publicity -- 20.3.3.Price Guarantees -- 20.4.Tacit Collusion and the Oligopoly Problem -- 20.4.1.U.S.: Conscious Parallelism -- 20.4.2.EU: Woodpulp -- 20.4.3.The Oligopoly Problem -- 20.5.Cooperation -- 20.5.1.United States -- 20.5.2.European Union -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- 21.Monopolization and Dominance -- 21.1.Introduction -- 21.2.Sherman Act Section 2 -- 21.2.1.Monopolization and the Rule of Reason -- 21.2.2.Antitrust Treatment of Predation -- 21.3.Abuse of a Dominant Position -- 21.3.1.Loyalty Rebates (II) -- 21.3.2.Exercise of Market Power -- 21.3.3.Predation -- 21.3.4.Refusal to Deal -- 21.3.5.Public Monopolies -- |
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Contents note continued: Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- 14.Innovation -- 14.1.Introduction -- 14.2.Schumpeterian Competition -- 14.2.1.Schumpeter Mark I -- 14.2.2.Schumpeter Mark II -- 14.3.Market Structure, Firm Size, and Innovation -- 14.3.1.Theory -- 14.3.2.Evidence -- 14.3.3.Beyond Schumpeter -- Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Problems -- 15.Promoting Innovation -- 15.1.Introduction -- 15.2.The Rate of Return to R&D -- 15.3.Financial Incentives -- 15.3.1.The Firm's R&D Investment Decision -- 15.3.2.Subsidies -- 15.3.3.Evidence -- 15.4.Indirect Support -- 15.5.R&D Cooperation -- 15.5.1.Types of R&D Cooperation -- 15.5.2.Cooperation Between? -- 15.5.3.The NCRA and Extensions -- 15.5.4.EU -- 15.6.Intellectual Property Rights -- 15.6.1.Background -- 15.6.2.Patent Effectiveness and Effects -- 15.6.3.The Flow (and Ebb?) of Patent Protection -- 15.6.4.The University-Industrial Complex -- 15.6.5.Copyright -- 15.6.6.Reprise: Intellectual Property Rights -- |
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Contents note continued: Summary -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- Appendix I Taxes and the Rental Cost of Capital Services -- Appendix II Duopoly Innovation Races -- Problem -- 16.Imperfectly Competitive International Markets -- 16.1.Introduction -- 16.2.Intraindustry Trade -- 16.2.1.Quantity-setting Firms -- 16.2.2.Price-setting Firms -- 16.3.Trade and Domestic Market Performance -- 16.4.Strategic Trade Policy -- 16.4.1.Subsidies: Quantity-setting Firms -- 16.4.2.Subsidies: Price-setting Firms -- 16.4.3.The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy -- 16.4.4.Tariffs and Quotas -- 16.4.5.Import Barriers and Export-Promotion -- 16.5.Exchange Rate Passthrough -- 16.6.Trade, Market Structure, and Firm Structure -- 16.6.1.Mode of Supply to a Foreign Market -- 16.6.2.Tariff-jumping DFI -- 16.6.3.Exports vs. DFI: Substitutes or Complements? -- 16.6.4.Hysteresis -- 16.7.Trade Policy and Competition Policy -- 16.7.1.Export Cartels -- 16.7.2.Voluntary Export Restraints -- |
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Machine generated contents note: 1.Introduction -- 1.1.Origins -- 1.2.Structure-Conduct-Performance -- 1.2.1.Models vs. Markets -- 1.2.2.Pricing Behaviour -- 1.2.3.A General Framework -- 1.3.The Oligopoly Problem and the First Chicago School -- 1.3.1.Tacit Collusion -- 1.3.2.Deconcentration -- 1.4.The Second Chicago School -- 1.4.1.Laissez Faire -- 1.4.2.Good Approximation -- 1.4.3.Efficiency Critique -- 1.4.4.Neoclassical Theory -- 1.5.Game Theory -- 1.5.1.Realistic Assumptions -- 1.5.2.Models of Strategic Behaviour -- 1.5.3.Empirical Foundations -- 1.6.There and Back Again: Methodological Synthesis -- 1.7.Alternative Approaches -- 1.7.1.Managerial/Behavioural -- 1.7.2.Schumpeter/Dynamic Market Performance -- 1.8.Organization of the Book -- Study Points -- Further Reading -- pt. I Basic Market Models -- 2.Basic Market Models -- 2.1.Introduction -- 2.2.Perfect Competition -- 2.2.1.Market Demand -- 2.2.2.Supply: Single Firm -- 2.2.3.Industry Supply and Short-run Equilibrium -- |
| Summary |
Industrial Organization is a central branch of microeconomics that has historically provoked a great deal of debate among economists. The author draws on this debate and economic history in order to examine the economics of markets, industries and their participants and in doing so addresses the implications for public policy towards business behaviour. This book leads students through the essential concepts that are central to understanding the strategic behaviour of firms and the policy questions at the heart of Industrial Organization. It takes an international approach, examining both US Antitrust and EU Competition Policy and their development |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes, appendices, bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Industrial organization.
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| LC no. |
2010281020 |
| ISBN |
0199291195 (paperback) |
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9780199291199 (paperback) |
