| Description |
xii, 278 pages ; 24cm |
|
regular print |
| Contents |
1. The official story -- 2. Have boards been bargaining at arm's length? -- 3. Shareholders' limited power to intervene -- 4. The limits of market forces -- 5. The managerial power perspective -- 6. The relationship between power and pay -- 7. Managerial influence on the way out -- 8. Retirement benefits -- 9. Executive loans -- 10. Non-equity-based compensation -- 11. Windfalls in conventional options -- 12. Excuses for conventional options -- 13. More on windfalls in equity-based compensation -- 14. Freedom to unwind equity incentives -- 15. Improving executive compensation -- 16. Improving corporate governance |
| Summary |
"Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of executives' power to influence their own pay - and of the structural defects in corporate governance that give them this power. As this book demonstrates, boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried give a richly detailed account of how pay practices - from option plans to retirement benefits - have decoupled compensation from performance and camouflaged both the amount and the performance-insensitivity of pay. They show that flaws in pay arrangements and the pay-setting process have been widespread and systemic. These problems have hurt shareholders both by increasing pay levels and, even more important, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives."--BOOK JACKET |
| Analysis |
Executive remuneration |
|
Corporate governance |
|
Management boards |
|
Shareholders |
|
Overseas item |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Executives -- Salaries, etc.
|
|
Corporate governance.
|
| Author |
Fried, Jesse
|
| LC no. |
2004052253 |
| ISBN |
0674016653 hardback |
|
