| Description |
viii, 152 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Contents |
Ch. 1. Introduction -- Pt. I. Threats. Ch. 2. Theoretical conditions for a threat to be effective. Ch. 3. Making international threats credible -- Pt. II. Bargaining. Ch. 4. Commitments and bargaining -- Pt. III. Compliance. Ch. 5. Explaining compliance. Ch. 6. Self-enforcing agreements. Ch. 7. External enforcement. Ch. 8. Verification, incentives and compliance -- Pt. IV. Conclusion. Ch. 9. Games and international relations theory |
| Summary |
Organised in 3 parts, and using modern game theory as an analytical tool, this book analyses the difficult art of commitment in international relations. No knowledge of game theory is needed for this book |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [143]-152) and index |
| Subject |
Treaties -- Psychological aspects.
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Negotiation.
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Threat (Psychology)
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Game theory.
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| LC no. |
97033719 |
| ISBN |
1855674874 hardcover |
|
1855674882 paperback |
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