| Description |
1 online resource (viii, 59 pages) : color maps (digital, PDF file) |
| Contents |
Foreword. -- Key findings. -- Executive summary. -- Introduction. -- Purposes, presumptions, and processes. -- The meaning of containment. -- Structures of deterrence. -- Assessing the prospects for deterrence. -- US military requirements for assured deterrence. -- The costs of containment. -- Map 1: The broader Middle East. -- Map 2: Problems for containment: Receding US force posture. -- Notes. -- About the authors |
| Analysis |
Iran nuclear policy containment deterrence regime military United |
| Notes |
December 2011 |
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"A report by the American Enterprise Institute." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 50-57) |
| Notes |
Many have suggested that containing a nuclear Iran is a reasonable option, possibly more desirable than confrontation. Containment is hardly a cost-free policy, but aside from a small handful of policy sketches proffered heretofore, little thought has gone into what an effective containment and deterrent regime will require of the United States and its allies. Even without a nuclear weapon, Iran is difficult to deter: its diffuse leadership structures and constant domestic power struggles make it hard to determine which individual leaders, groups of leaders and institutions should be the objects and targets of deterrence. Furthermore, the Iranian approach to military power is a highly asymmetrical strategy that substitutes nuclear weapons, irregulars, proxies, and terrorism for conventional strength. The keystone of any containment policy is a military strategy of deterrence. Adopting a serious policy of containment and strategy of deterrence will have implications for US nuclear policy and forces. A serious policy of containment and deterrence calls for a constant and significant conventional force presence around Iran's perimeter. US military planners must also consider the feasibility of eliminating Iran's nuclear retaliatory options in a single raid or rapid-strike campaign given that Iran stands on the brink of developing not just a single weapon but a modest breakout capability for a more robust arsenal that would provide a survivable deterrent. The diplomatic, strategic, and military costs of containing and deterring are already high. In conclusion, we find that though containment and deterrence are possible policies and strategies for the United States and others to adopt when faced with a nuclear Iran, we cannot share the widespread enthusiasm entertained in many quarters |
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Title from title screen (viewed on December 10, 2011) |
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Mode of access: World Wide Web |
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System requirements: Adobe Reader |
| Subject |
Nuclear weapons -- Iran -- Strategic aspects
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Nuclear nonproliferation -- Iran
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Nuclear arms control -- Iran
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Deterrence (Strategy)
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Security, International.
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Deterrence (Strategy)
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International relations.
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Nuclear arms control.
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Nuclear nonproliferation.
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Security, International.
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| SUBJECT |
United States -- Relations -- Iran
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| Subject |
Iran.
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United States.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Pletka, Danielle
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Zarif, Maseh.
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American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
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