| Description |
1 online resource (xiii, 440 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
Lecture notes in computer science, 0302-9743 ; 8289 |
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Lecture notes in computer science. Advanced research in computing and software science |
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LNCS sublibrary. SL 1, Theoretical computer science and general issues |
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Lecture notes in computer science. Advanced research in computing and software science.
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Lecture notes in computer science ; 8289.
|
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LNCS sublibrary. SL 1, Theoretical computer science and general issues.
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| Contents |
The Asymmetric Matrix Partition Problem / Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Iftah Gamzu and Moshe Tennenholtz -- Polylogarithmic Supports Are Required for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria below 2/3 / Yogesh Anbalagan, Sergey Norin, Rahul Savani and Adrian Vetta -- The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship / Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt and Markus Brill -- Incentives and Efficiency in Uncertain Collaborative Environments / Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Milan Vojnović -- Revenue Maximization with Nonexcludable Goods / MohammadHossein Bateni, Nima Haghpanah, Balasubramanian Sivan and Morteza Zadimoghaddam -- On Lookahead Equilibria in Congestion Games / Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli and Luca Moscardelli -- Trading Agent Kills Market Information / Rainer Böhme and Jens Grossklags -- Designing Markets for Daily Deals / Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta and Bo Waggoner |
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The Exact Computational Complexity of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies / Vincent Conitzer -- The Price of Anarchy of the Proportional Allocation Mechanism Revisited / José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz and Nicolás E. Stier-Moses -- Can Credit Increase Revenue? / Nishanth Dikkala and Éva Tardos -- Mechanism Design for Aggregating Energy Consumption and Quality of Service in Speed Scaling Scheduling / Christoph Dürr, Łukasz Jeż and Óscar C. Vásquez -- Valuation Compressions in VCG-Based Combinatorial Auctions / Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger -- Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions / Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier and Vasilis Syrgkanis -- Competition in the Presence of Social Networks: How Many Service Providers Maximize Welfare? / Moran Feldman, Reshef Meir and Moshe Tennenholtz -- Resolving Braess's Paradox in Random Networks / Dimitris Fotakis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Thanasis Lianeas and Paul G. Spirakis |
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Truthfulness Flooded Domains and the Power of Verification for Mechanism Design / Dimitris Fotakis and Emmanouil Zampetakis -- A Protocol for Cutting Matroids Like Cakes / Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot and Lydia Tlilane -- Quantitative Comparative Statics for a Multimarket Paradox / Tobias Harks and Philipp von Falkenhausen -- Designing Profit Shares in Matching and Coalition Formation Games / Martin Hoefer and Lisa Wagner -- Jealousy Graphs: Structure and Complexity of Decentralized Stable Matching / Moshe Hoffman, Daniel Moeller and Ramamohan Paturi -- Linear Regression as a Non-cooperative Game / Stratis Ioannidis and Patrick Loiseau -- Optimal Allocation for Chunked-Reward Advertising / Weihao Kong, Jian Li, Tie-Yan Liu and Tao Qin -- Bicriteria Online Matching: Maximizing Weight and Cardinality / Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni and Morteza Zadimoghaddam -- Mitigating Covert Compromises / Aron Laszka, Benjamin Johnson and Jens Grossklags |
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Characterization of Truthful Mechanisms for One-Dimensional Single Facility Location Game with Payments / Pinyan Lu and Lan Yu -- Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects / Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis and Éva Tardos -- Exchange Markets: Strategy Meets Supply-Awareness / Ruta Mehta and Milind Sohoni -- A Lemke-Like Algorithm for the Multiclass Network Equilibrium Problem / Frédéric Meunier and Thomas Pradeau -- Near-Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design for Covering Problems with Correlated Players / Hadi Minooei and Chaitanya Swamy -- Bounding the Inefficiency of Altruism through Social Contribution Games / Mona Rahn and Guido Schäfer -- Welfare-Improving Cascades and the Effect of Noisy Reviews / Nick Arnosti and Daniel Russo -- The Complexity of Computing the Random Priority Allocation Matrix / Daniela Saban and Jay Sethuraman -- Vickrey Auctions for Irregular Distributions / Balasubramanian Sivan and Vasilis Syrgkanis -- Strategy-Proof and Efficient Offline Interval Scheduling and Cake Cutting / Yuan Tian |
| Summary |
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2013, held in Cambridge, MA, USA, in December 2013. The 36 revised full papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 150 submissions and cover research in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and author index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Internet -- Economic aspects -- Congresses
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Computer networks -- Economic aspects -- Congresses
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World Wide Web -- Economic aspects -- Congresses
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Econometrics -- Congresses
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Internet -- economics
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Computer Communication Networks -- economics
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Computer networks -- Economic aspects
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Econometrics
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Internet -- Economic aspects
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Engineering & Applied Sciences.
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Computer Science.
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| Genre/Form |
proceedings (reports)
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Conference papers and proceedings
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Conference papers and proceedings.
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Actes de congrès.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Chen, Yiling (Associate Professor of computer science), editor.
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Immorlica, Nicole, editor
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| ISBN |
9783642450464 |
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3642450466 |
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