| Description |
1 online resource (158 p.) |
| Contents |
Intro -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Part I. The Agency Problem -- 1. Core Argument and Methodology -- 1. Prelude: The Core Argument -- 2. Chapter Outline -- 3. Methodology: Philosophy and Cognitive Science -- 4. The Metaphor Mistake -- 5. Rationality and Avoiding the Homunculus in Stanovich's Two Systems Accounts -- 6. The Bone of Contention: Reflective Control -- 7. The Aim of the Book: The Role of Tinkering -- 2. The Simple Argument -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Is the Argument Really Valid? -- 3. Doxastic Involuntarism |
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4. Doxastic Deliberation -- 5. Intentional and Still No Reward? -- 6. A Few Words on Evaluative Control -- 7. What Is System Two? -- 8. Is System Two Processing Always Intentional? -- 3. Objections to the Simple Argument -- 1. What Are Beliefs? -- 2. Acceptance -- 3. Two Types of Belief? -- 4. Motivated Reasoning -- 5. Do Unruly Beliefs Pose a Threat for the Simple Argument? -- 6. Spinozean Accounts of Belief Acquisition -- 7. Deliberation and Skill -- 8. The Lessons from the Simple Argument? -- 4. Extending and Shrinking Agents -- 1. Levy's Argument |
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2. The Inverse and the Negative Parity Principle -- 3. Where Are We Now? -- 4. Is It Really True that Accepting Extended Mental Actions Means Accepting Extended Cognition? -- 5. What Happens to Deliberation if Only Evaluative Agency Is Cognitive? -- 6. Intuitive Judgments and Social Reasoning -- 5. Metacognition -- 1. Thinking about Thinking -- 2. Metarepresentation and Mindshaping -- 3. Metarepresentation and Shepherding -- 4. Is Metarepresentational Managerial Control an Argument to Uphold the Distinction Between Brain-Bound and Environment-Involving Actions? |
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Part II. System Two and the Moral Mind -- 6. Willpower and Epistemic Agency -- 1. What Is Willpower? -- 2. Why Willpower Is a Tying to the Mast Strategy -- 3. Where Did All the Struggle Go? -- 4. Confronting and Avoiding Temptation -- 5. Tying and Being Tied -- 6. System One and System Two -- 7. Round Up -- 7. How Choices Can Be Actions -- 1. Holton's Argument -- 2. Holton's Choice Complications -- 3. Choice as Managerial Control -- 4. A Problem_ Is Choice Really Attitude-Directed Managerial Action? -- 5. Metacognitive Feelings and Uncertainty -- 6. Conclusion |
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8. Diachronicity: Intentional or Rational? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Levy's Argument -- 3. Why Assertibility Matters -- 4. What Is the Problem? -- 5. Logic Entailments -- 6. Control by Effortful Reasoning? -- 7. Intentional Mental Actions and the Moral Agent -- 8. The Special Power of Aware Managerial Control -- 9. Is There a Middle Way? -- 9. At the Very End -- 1. Summing Up -- 2. How the Tinkering Mind Became the Tinkering Mind -- Bibliography -- Index |
| Summary |
Epistemic agency is a crucial concept in many areas of philosophy and cognitive sciences. But what is it? The Tinkering Mind argues that epistemic agency has two distinct, incompatible definitions - intentional mental action, or a distinct non-voluntary form of evaluative agency, both of which lead to surprising, counterintuitive consequences |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Subject |
Act (Philosophy)
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Act (Philosophy)
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780192646682 |
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0192646680 |
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