| Description |
1 online resource (472 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Contents; Preface for the Reader; Preface for the Instructor; Part I: Voting; Introduction to Part I; 1: Two Candidates; 2: Social Choice Functions; 3: Criteria for Social Choice; 4: Which Methods Are Good?; 5: Arrow's Theorem; 6: Variations on the Theme; Notes on Part I; Part II: Apportionment; Introduction to Part II; 7: Hamilton's Method; 8: Divisor Methods; 9: Criteria and Impossibility; 10: The Method of Balinski and Young; 11: Deciding among Divisor Methods; 12: History of Apportionment in the United States; Notes on Part II; Part III: Conflict; Introduction to Part III |
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13: Strategies and Outcomes14: Chance and Expectation; 15: Solving Zero-Sum Games; 16: Conflict and Cooperation; 17: Nash Equilibria; 18: The Prisoner's Dilemma; Notes on Part III; Part IV: The Electoral College; Introduction to Part IV; 19: Weighted Voting; 20: Whose Advantage?; Notes on Part IV; Solutions to Odd-Numbered Exercises and Problems; Bibliography; Back Cover |
| Summary |
What Ralph Nader's spoiler role in the 2000 presidential election tells us about the American political system. Why Montana went to court to switch the 1990 apportionment to Dean's method. How the US tried to use game theory to win the Cold War, and why it didn't work. When students realize that mathematical thinking can address these sorts of pressing concerns of the political world it naturally sparks their interest in the underlying mathematics. A Mathematical Look at Politics is designed as an alternative to the usual mathematics texts for students in quantitative reasoning courses. It app |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Political science -- Mathematics
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Ullman, Daniel H
|
| ISBN |
9781439891179 |
|
1439891176 |
|
