| Description |
1 online resource (268 p.) |
| Series |
Routledge Library Editions: Nuclear Security Ser |
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Routledge Library Editions: Nuclear Security Ser
|
| Contents |
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Original Title Page -- Original Copyright Page -- Foreword -- Contents -- Preface -- Glossary -- Part I International Safeguards -- Chapter 1. Overview -- Chapter 2. The three main elements -- I. The Board of Governors -- II. IAEA-state relations -- III. The IAEA Secretariat -- Chapter 3. The political framework and constraints -- I. What can safeguards do? -- II. The case of KANUPP -- III. Stockpiling safeguarded weapon material -- IV. Inflated expectations -- V. IAEA safeguards in nuclear weapon states -- VI. Prospects for improvement |
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Chapter 4. The technical basis -- I. How the safeguards system evolved -- II. The technical aims -- III. The methods -- IV. Verification procedures -- Design review -- Maintenance of records -- Reports -- Inspections -- V. Confidence and secrecy -- VI. Non-NPT guidelines -- Chapter 5. The risk of secret nuclear plants -- I. Confidence in the IAEA's coverage -- II. Completeness of the 'initial report' -- III. The possibility of subsequent secret construction -- IV. How can the IAEA's information be supplemented? -- V. The non-NPT case -- The Franco-Pakistani reprocessing plant agreement |
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Chapter 6. Limits to the present approach -- I. Cheating the accounting system -- A secret fuel cycle? (scenario A) -- Non-co-operation (scenario B) -- The law's delay (scenario C) -- II. Broadening the approach -- Chapter 7. Problems with safeguards methods -- I. Material accountancy -- The light water reactor (LWR) -- The heavy water reactor (HWR) -- The fast breeder reactor (FBR) -- The high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HTGR) -- All reactors -- Material accountancy at other types of plant -- The 'timeliness' element of material accountancy -- 'Timely warning' |
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II. Use and performance of containment and surveillance equipment -- Chapter 8. Problems with safeguards procedures -- I. Design review -- II. Records and reports -- III. Inspections -- Limits on the amount of IAEA inspection -- Limits on access by inspectors -- Designation of inspectors -- Chapter 9. SAGSI and SIR -- I. SAGSI -- II. SIR -- Chapter 10. Regional safeguards systems, EURATOM and Japan -- I. The Treaty of Tlatelolco -- II. The EURATOM system -- III. The special treatment of EURATOM -- IV. Japan -- Chapter 11. Defects of the safeguards documents -- I. INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 |
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Defects of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 and related documents -- Negotiating problems -- Some advantages of INFCIRC/66/Rev. 2 -- II. INFCIRC/153 (the model NPT safeguards agreement) -- Defects of the NPT model -- Smaller plants may be more 'dangerous' than larger ones -- Storage of separated plutonium -- At what point does diversion begin? -- State's rights versus the IAEA's rights -- Secrecy -- Ill. Should amendments be attempted? -- IV. What would happen if NPT safeguards came to an end? -- Chapter 12. The IAEA's interfaces with states -- I. Government attitudes towards safeguards |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Nuclear nonproliferation.
|
|
Nuclear nonproliferation
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| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Szasz, Paul
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|
Goldblat, Jozef
|
| ISBN |
9781000199673 |
|
1000199673 |
|
9781000199871 |
|
1000199878 |
|
9781000199772 |
|
1000199770 |
|
9781003054580 |
|
1003054587 |
|
