| Description |
1 online resource (44 pages) |
| Series |
IMF working paper, 1018-5941 ; WP/04/219 |
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IMF working paper ; WP/04/219.
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| Contents |
""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. A Model of Coinsurance""; ""A. Exogenous Risk Case: No Moral Hazard""; ""B. Endogenous Risk Case: Moral Hazard""; ""C. Interdependence and Coinsurance: Asymmetry Matters""; ""D. Moral Hazard in Coinsurance Arrangements""; ""III. Operating the Coinsurance Arrangement""; ""A. A Model of IMF Lending""; ""B. The IMF�s Objective Function""; ""C. Policy Strategy for the Country""; ""D. The IMF�s Choice of the Lending Contract""; ""E. Timing of Loan Contracts""; ""F. Precommitment and Time-consistency""; ""IV. Concluding Remarks""; ""Appendix: Proofs"" |
| Summary |
Annotation The paper shows that a coinsurance arrangement among countries can, in principle, play a useful role in helping countries bear the risks involved in developing their economies and integrating into the global financial system. the operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts offered by the IMF. the analysis suggests that, if the IMFs objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentivesinduce higher effort by member countries to avoid and overcome crisesthan an ex-post loan contract. Such ex ante contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritans dilemma and time inconsistency. the paper also shows that state-contingent repayment schemes are needed to deal with King Lears dilemma |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212 MiAaHDL |
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digitized 2010 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve pda MiAaHDL |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
International Monetary Fund.
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| SUBJECT |
International Monetary Fund fast |
| Subject |
Moral hazard.
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|
Moral hazard
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Śarmā, Sunīla, author.
|
|
Shim, Ilhyock, author.
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International Monetary Fund.
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IMF Institute.
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| ISBN |
1282395548 |
|
9781282395541 |
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9781451875201 |
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1451875207 |
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9781451919806 |
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1451919808 |
| ISSN |
1018-5941 |
|
