| Description |
1 online resource (329 p.) |
| Series |
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy Ser |
|
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy Ser
|
| Contents |
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Acknowledgments -- List of Contributors -- Chapter 1: Introduction*: Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion -- Notes -- References -- Part I: Concepts and Experience* -- References -- Chapter 2: Concepts and Experience: A Non-Representationalist Perspective -- 2.1 What Abilities Can Do for the Philosophy of Mind -- 2.2 Conceptions of Concepts -- 2.3 Concepts, Abilities, and Rules -- 2.4 Experience and Perception -- 2.5 Experience and Conceptual Thought -- 2.6 The Myth of the Given: Qualia |
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2.7 The Myth of Spontaneity -- Note -- References -- Chapter 3: Conceptualism and the Notion of a Concept -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Concepts and the Representation of Generality -- 3.3 Children's Sorting Behavior and Primitive Normativity -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: Concepts, Belief, and Perception1 -- 4.1 Concepts -- 4.2 Belief -- 4.2.1 Occurrent and Dispositional Belief -- 4.2.2 Implicit and Explicit Beliefs -- 4.2.3 Belief and Dispositions -- 4.2.4 Belief and the Space of Reasons -- 4.3 Perception -- Notes -- References |
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Chapter 5: The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Epistemic Significance of Perception and Epistemic Justification -- 5.3 PIK on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification -- 5.4 PINK on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification -- 5.5 Reasons-First on the Epistemic Significance of Perception and on Epistemic Justification -- 5.6 Results -- Notes -- References -- Part II: Concepts and Language* -- References -- Chapter 6: Conceptual Thought Without Language? The Case from Animal Cognition |
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6.1 The Argument from Animal Cognition -- 6.2 Defending the Explanatory Premise -- 6.2.1 The First Challenge: Instrumentalism -- 6.2.2 The Second Challenge: Indeterminacy -- 6.2.3 Third Challenge: Higher-Order Thoughts -- 6.3 Thought Involving Concepts -- Note -- References -- Chapter 7: Concepts, Normativity, and Self-Knowledge: On Ginsborg's Notion of Primitive Normativity -- 7.1 Concepts and Normativity -- 7.2 The Kripkean Dilemma -- 7.3 Primitive Normativity -- 7.4 Normativity without Justification? -- 7.5 Normativity Without Error? -- 7.6 Conclusion -- Notes -- References |
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Chapter 8: A Role for Language in Concept Formation -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Disclosing Concept Formation and Its Epistemic Importance -- 8.3 An Argument Against the Possibility of Disclosing Concept Formation -- 8.4 Sellars on the Meaning of Theoretical Terms -- 8.5 From Sellarsian Interpretation to Disclosing Concept Formation -- 8.6 The Necessity of Language Use in Sellarsian Interpretation -- 8.7 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 9: Practical Understanding, Concepts, and Language* -- 9.1 Understanding -- 9.3 Affordances, Concepts, and Propositions -- Notes -- References |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Schröder, Dirk
|
| ISBN |
9780429850073 |
|
0429850077 |
|
