| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: Bad Options and Difficult Choices in the Eurozone Crisis -- Short Primer on the Eurozone Crisis -- Unequal Distribution of Crisis-Resolution Costs -- Bad Options, Difficult Choices -- Argument in Brief -- Plan of the Book -- Putting the Eurozone Crisis in Context: Country-Level Vulnerability Profiles -- Interest Group Vulnerability Profile and Crisis Resolution Preferences -- Crisis Politics -- Conclusion -- 2. Putting the Eurozone Crisis Experience in Perspective -- Argument: Vulnerability Profiles and Crisis Responses -- Weighing Bad Options: The Potential Costs of External and Internal Adjustment -- Relative Costs of Adjustment: Vulnerability Profiles and Policy Responses -- Research Design -- Sample Selection: Identifying Balance-of-Payment Crises -- Operationalization: Vulnerability Profiles -- How is the Euro Crisis Different? Putting the Eurozone Crisis in Context -- 1992 EMS Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis -- 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis -- Eastern European Responses to the 2008/9 Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Crisis -- Crisis Dynamics: Changing Vulnerabilities in the Eurozone Crisis -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 3. Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Deficit Countries -- Interest Groups and Deficit Country Policymaking -- Group-Specific Adjustment Preferences in Eurozone Deficit Countries -- Interest Group Vulnerability to External Adjustment -- Interest Group Vulnerability to Internal Adjustment -- Group-Specific Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Crisis Resolution Strategies -- Research Design -- Case Selection -- Interest Group Survey: Sampling and Design -- Structure of the Analysis -- Policy-Specific Preferences on Eurozone Crisis Management -- Preferences about Overall Crisis Management Strategies -- External Adjustment Policies -- Internal Adjustment Policies -- Financing Policies -- Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Eurozone Crisis Management Strategies -- Vulnerability Profiles of Deficit Country Interest Groups -- Vulnerability Profiles and Evaluations of Crisis Strategies -- Choosing Among Bad Options: Preferred Crisis Management Strategies in Trade-Off Situations -- Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Adjustment Strategies -- Conclusion: From Adjustment Preferences to Adjustment Policies -- Appendix -- 4. Crisis Politics in Deficit Countries -- Ireland in Crisis -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding External Adjustment in Ireland -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Internal Adjustment in Ireland -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Financing in Ireland -- Crisis Politics in Ireland: Conclusion -- Spain in Crisis -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding External Adjustment in Spain -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Internal Adjustment in Spain -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Financing in Spain -- Crisis Politics in Spain: Conclusion -- Greece in Crisis -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding External Adjustment in Greece -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Internal Adjustment in Greece -- Policies and Conflict Lines Surrounding Financing in Greece -- Crisis Politics in Greece: Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 5. Surplus Country Vulnerability to Rebalancing: A Comparative Analysis -- Introduction -- Surplus Country Preferences and National Interests in the Eurozone Crisis -- Vulnerability Profiles -- Concept and Argument -- Weighing Bad Options: Vulnerabilities to External and Internal Adjustment -- Research Design -- Sample Selection: Identifying Surplus Countries during Balance-of-Payments Crises -- Operationalization: Vulnerability Profiles -- Creating the Cost Indexes Using PCA -- Vulnerability Profiles of Surplus Countries in the Eurozone Crisis -- Vulnerability Profiles of Non-Eurozone Surplus Countries during the Eurozone Crisis -- Vulnerability Profiles of Surplus Countries in the 1992/3 EMS Crisis -- Conclusion -- 6. Distributive Conflict and Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries -- Domestic Trade-Offs, Vulnerability Profiles, and Adjustment in Surplus Countries -- Research Design: Studying Interest Group Preferences in Surplus Countries -- Policy-Specific Preferences on Eurozone Crisis Management -- External Adjustment Preferences -- Internal Adjustment Preferences -- Financing Preferences -- Material Interests and Policy Preferences -- Policy Salience -- Trade-Offs and Difficult Choices between External Adjustment, Internal Adjustment, and Financing -- Vulnerability Profiles and Preferred Crisis Responses -- Conclusion -- 7. Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries: Caught between Voter Pressure and Interest Group Stalemate -- Voter Preferences about How to Resolve the Eurozone Crisis -- External Adjustment: Surplus Country Voters and a Breakup of the Eurozone -- Internal Adjustment: Public Opinion on Domestic Rebalancing -- Financing: Public Opinion on Financial Transfers to Deficit States -- Diverging Preferences: Public Opinion and Interest Group Preferences in the Euro Crisis -- Voters, Interest Groups, and Eurozone Crisis Politics in Surplus Countries -- Eurozone Crisis Politics in Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands -- Not an Option: External Adjustment -- Vocal Politics of Financing in Surplus Countries -- Context Matters: The Politics of Internal Adjustment -- Germany -- Austria -- Netherlands -- Internal Adjustment in Eurozone Surplus Countries -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- 8. Conclusion -- Three New Perspectives on the Eurozone Crisis -- What's So Special? Analyzing the Eurozone Crisis in a Comparative Perspective -- Examining the Road not Traveled: Policy Alternatives and Trade-Offs -- Looking at Both Sides of the Coin: Crisis Politics in Both Deficit-Debtor and Surplus-Creditor Countries -- Politics of Bad Options in European Crisis Management -- Research Design -- Eurozone Crisis Bargaining between Deficit-Debtor and Surplus-Creditor States -- Policy Implications and Avenues for Future Research -- Appendix |
| Summary |
Why was the Eurozone crisis so difficult to resolve? Why was it resolved in a manner in which some countries bore a much larger share of the pain than other countries? Why did no country leave the Eurozone rather than implement unprecedented austerity? Who supported and opposed the different policy options in the crisis domestically, and how did the distributive struggles among these groups shape crisis politics? Building on macro-level statistical data, original survey data from interest groups, and qualitative comparative case studies, this book argues and shows that the answers to these questions revolve around distributive struggles about how the costs of the Eurozone crisis should be divided among countries, and within countries, among different socioeconomic groups |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed December 17, 2020) |
| Subject |
Financial crises -- Europe -- 21st century
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Financial crises.
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Europe.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Ray, Ari, author
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Redeker, Nils, author
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| ISBN |
9780192599094 |
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0192599097 |
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9780191890123 |
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019189012X |
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