| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
Philosophy of mind |
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Philosophy of mind series.
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| Contents |
Cover; Half title; Series page; The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Overview; Part One Introduction; 1. Fixing Reference on Intentionality; 1.1 Aboutness and Directedness; 1.2 The Ostensive Way of Fixing Reference; 1.3 Other Ways of Fixing Reference; 1.4 Worries with the Ostensive Definition; 1.5 Conclusion; 2. Goals and Methodology; 2.1 What is a Theory of Intentionality?; 2.2 Theory-Independent Access to Intentionality; 2.3 Conclusion; Part Two Alternative Theories of Intentionality; 3. The Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories |
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3.1 Tracking Theories3.2 Overview of the Mismatch Problem for Tracking Theories; 3.3 Background and Assumptions; 3.4 A Mismatch Case: Perceptual Color Representations; 3.5 Other Mismatch Cases; 3.6 Objections; 3.7 Reliable Misrepresentation and the Significance of Tracking; 3.8 Conclusion; Appendix A: Objections to the Mismatch Problem; 4. Functional Role Theories and Tracking Theories Again; 4.1 The Functional Role Theory; 4.2 Worries with Short-Arm Functional Role Theories; 4.3 Worries with Long-Arm Functional Role Theories |
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4.4 The Real Problem with Both Tracking Theories and Functional Role Theories4.5 Conclusion; Part Three The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5. The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5.1 The Phenomenal Intentionality Theory; 5.2 Arguments for PIT; 5.3 Identity PIT; 5.4 Challenging Cases; 5.5 Conclusion; Appendix B: The Extent of Phenomenal Intentionality; Appendix C: The Multiple Arisability of Intentional States; 6. PIT's Status as a Theory of Intentionality; 6.1 Is PIT a Theory of Intentionality in Terms of Phenomenal Consciousness?; 6.2 Is PIT Trivial?; 6.3 Is PIT Interesting? |
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6.4 Is PIT Naturalistic?6.5 Conclusion; Part Four Challenging Cases; 7. Thought; 7.1 The Challenge for PIT from Thought; 7.2 Thoughts' Phenomenal Contents; 7.3 Self-Ascriptivism about Thoughts' Alleged Contents; 7.4 Is Derived Mental Representation a Type of Intentionality?; 7.5 Conclusion: PIT about Thought; Appendix D: Derived Mental Representation in Perception; Appendix E: Attitudes; 8 Nonconscious States; 8.1 The Problem with Nonconscious States; 8.2 Derivativist Strategies; 8.3 Standing States; 8.4 Allegedly Nonconscious Occurrent States; 8.5 Conclusion; Part Five The Aspect View |
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9. Is Intentionality a Relation to a Content?9.1 The Relation View and the Aspect View; 9.2 Two Worries with the Relation View; 9.3 The Alleged Virtues of the Relation View; 9.4 Conclusion; Appendix F: The Aspect View and Adverbialism; Appendix G: Contents as First- or Second-Order States or Properties; Appendix H: An Internal Theory of Truth and Reference; Part Six Conclusion; 10. Conclusion: Intentionality and Other Related Phenomena; 10.1 Return to Other Ways of Fixing Reference on Intentionality; 10.2 Radical Internalism; Glossary; Bibliography; Index |
| Summary |
Mendelovici proposes a novel theory of intentionality in terms of phenomenal consciousness, arguing that the view avoids the problems of its competitors and can accommodate a wide range of cases, including those of thought and nonconscious states |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed April 26, 2018) |
| Subject |
Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Phenomenology.
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phenomenology.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Movements -- Humanism.
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Phenomenology
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Intentionalität
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Phänomenologie
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780190863814 |
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0190863811 |
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0190843381 |
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9780190843380 |
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9780190863838 |
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0190863838 |
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