| Description |
1 online resource (305 pages) |
| Series |
Routledge Explorations in Environmental Economics |
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Routledge explorations in environmental economics.
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| Contents |
Half Title; Series Information; Title Page; Copyright Page; Table of Contents; List of Figures; List of Tables; List of Contributors; Introduction; Notes; References; Part I Stability; 1 What drives compliance with international environmental agreements?: A political economy analysis of international ... ; 1 Introduction; 2 Theoretical background; 3 International determinants of compliance; 3.1 Reputation; 3.2 IEA design; Hard law versus soft law; Transparency mechanisms; Inducement mechanisms; 4 National determinants; 4.1 Role of domestic institutions; Democracy versus autocracy |
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A closer look on electoral institutions and preferences of domestic constituents4.2 Role of domestic actors; Domestic voters; Interest groups and non-governmental organizations; 5 Conclusion and further remarks; Notes; References; 2 Stable environmental agreements and international trade in asymmetric oligopoly markets; 1 Introduction; 2 The model; 2.1 The households; 2.2 The firms and the environmental damage; 3 Global agreement: the grand coalition BG; 4 No agreement: the singleton coalition structure Bs; 5 Partial agreement: the coalition structure B(i, j) |
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6 IEAs and coalition formation6.1 Preliminaries; 6.2 The grand coalition BG versus the singleton coalition Bs; 6.3 The possibility of subcoalitions B(i, j); 6.3.1 The coalition B(i, j) versus the singleton coalition Bs; 6.3.2 Equilibrium coalition structures; 6.4 Interpretation of the results; 7 Conclusion; 8 Appendix; 8.1 Proof of Lemma 1; 8.2 Proof of Lemma 3; 8.3 Proof of Proposition 1; 8.4 Proof of Proposition 2; Acknowledgements; Notes; References |
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3 The effects of inequality aversion on the formation of climate coalition: Theory and experimental evidence 1 Introduction; 2 The model; 2.1 Inequality-averse preference in a coalition game; 3 Experiment design and procedure; 3.1 An inequality-averse preference test; 3.2 Coalition game experiment; 4 Experimental results; 5 Conclusions; Notes; References; Part II Heterogeneous countries; 4 Transnational environmental agreements with heterogeneous actors; 1 Introduction; 2 Current transnational approaches in the global governance literature |
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3 Scope and limits of international environmental agreements4 Proposals for theoretical analysis; 4.1 Climate clubs; 4.2 City alliances; 4.3 Outlook; 5 Conclusions; References; 5 International trade and environmental cooperation among heterogeneous countries; 1 Introduction; 2 The basic model; 3 One shot game; 4 Repeated game; 5 Border tax adjustment; 6 Conclusion; Notes; References; 6 The effects of labour intensity and pollution damage on government policies and location choice; 1 Introduction; 2 The model; 2.1 Market stage game 1: North Firm produce in its country of origin |
| Notes |
2.2 Market stage game 2: both firms produce in South |
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Print version record |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Ça?atay, Selim
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M?hç?, Hakan
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| ISBN |
9781317231271 |
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1317231279 |
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