Description |
1 online resource (81 pages) |
Series |
SpringerBriefs in Computer Science |
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SpringerBriefs in computer science.
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Contents |
880-01 Overview -- Secondary spectrum market under supply uncertainty -- Secondary spectrum market under operator competition -- Conclusion |
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880-01/(S Machine generated contents note: 1. Overview -- 1.1. Issues of Static Spectrum Licensing -- 1.2. Cognitive Radios and Dynamic Spectrum Access -- 1.2.1. Spectrum Opportunity and Cognitive Radios -- 1.2.2. Three Typical Models in Dynamic Spectrum Access -- 1.3. Related Research -- 2. Secondary Spectrum Market Under Supply Uncertainty -- 2.1. Background -- 2.2. Network Model -- 2.2.1. Background on Spectrum Sensing and Leasing -- 2.2.2. Notations and Assumptions -- 2.2.3. Stackelberg Game -- 2.3. Backward Induction of the Four-Stage Game -- 2.3.1. Spectrum Allocation in Stage IV -- 2.3.2. Optimal Pricing Strategy in Stage III -- 2.3.3. Optimal Leasing Strategy in Stage II -- 2.3.4. Optimal Sensing Strategy in Stage I -- 2.4. Equilibrium Summary and Numerical Results -- 2.4.1. Robustness of the Observations -- 2.5. Impact of Spectrum Sensing Uncertainty -- 2.6. Learning the Distribution of Sensing Realization Factor α -- 2.6.1. Performance Evaluation of Machine Learning -- 2.7. Summary -- 2.8. Appendix -- 2.8.1. Proof of Theorem 2.1 -- 2.8.2. Proof of Theorem 2.2 -- 2.8.3. Supplementary Proof of Theorem 2.4 -- 3. Secondary Spectrum Market Under Operator Competition -- 3.1. Background -- 3.2. Network and Game Model -- 3.2.1. Users' and Operators' Models -- 3.3. Backward Induction of the Three-Stage Game -- 3.3.1. Spectrum Allocation in Stage in III -- 3.3.2. Operators' Pricing Competition in Stage II -- 3.3.3. Operators' Leasing Strategies in Stage I -- 3.4. Equilibrium Summary -- 3.4.1. How Network Dynamics Affect Equilibrium Decisions -- 3.5. Equilibrium Analysis Under General SNR Regime -- 3.6. Impact of Operator Competition -- 3.6.1. Maximum Profit in the Coordinated Case -- 3.6.2. Impact of Competition on Operators' Profits -- 3.6.3. Impact of Competition on Users' Payoffs -- 3.7. Summary -- 3.8. Appendix -- 3.8.1. Proof of Theorem 3.1 -- 3.8.2. Proof of Theorem 3.2 -- 4. Conclusion |
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Overview -- Secondary spectrum market under supply uncertainty -- Secondary spectrum market under operation competition -- Conclusion |
Summary |
This SpringerBrief provides an overview of cognitive mobile virtual network operator's (C-MVNO) decisions under investment flexibility, supply uncertainty, and market competition in cognitive radio networks. This is a new research area at the nexus of cognitive radio engineering and microeconomics. The authors focus on an operator's joint spectrum investment and service pricing decisions. The readers will learn how to tradeoff the two flexible investment choices (dynamic spectrum leasing and spectrum sensing) under supply uncertainty. Furthermore, if there is more than one operator, we present analysis of the competition among operators in obtaining spectrum and pricing services to attract users |
Analysis |
engineering |
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computernetwerken |
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computer networks |
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elektronica |
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electronics |
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elektriciteit |
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electricity |
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Engineering (General) |
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Techniek (algemeen) |
Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
Notes |
Print version record |
Subject |
Cognitive radio networks.
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Computer networks.
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Computer networks -- Management.
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Computer science.
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Computer Communication Networks
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Satellite Communications
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Electronic Data Processing
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COMPUTERS -- Computer Literacy.
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COMPUTERS -- Computer Science.
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COMPUTERS -- Data Processing.
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COMPUTERS -- Hardware -- General.
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COMPUTERS -- Information Technology.
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COMPUTERS -- Machine Theory.
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COMPUTERS -- Reference.
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Cognitive radio networks
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Computer networks
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Computer networks -- Management
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Computer science
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Form |
Electronic book
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Author |
Huang, Jianwei
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Shou, Biying
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ISBN |
9781461488903 |
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1461488907 |
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9781306164771 |
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130616477X |
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