| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- 1 Introduction: Applied Economics of Information and Risk -- References -- Part I Information and Its Applications -- 2 Incomplete Contract, Transaction-Specific Investment, and Bargaining Power -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Contract Incompleteness and Hold-Up -- 2.2.1 Unverifiability of the Level of Effort and the Quality of Goods -- 2.2.2 Sequential Investment and Option Contract -- 2.3 Bargaining Power and Information -- 2.3.1 The Allocation of Bargaining Power and Information -- 2.3.2 Ex-Ante Renegotiation and Bargaining Power |
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2.4 Investment and the Bargaining (I) -- 2.4.1 Transaction-Specific Investment and Its Verifiability -- 2.4.2 Bargaining and Optimal Investment -- 2.4.3 Verifiable Investment and the Two-Stage Bargaining -- 2.5 Investment and the Bargaining (II) -- 2.6 Transaction-Specific Investment and Business Groups -- 2.6.1 Reservation Price -- 2.6.2 Equilibrium Probability of Group Cancellation -- 2.6.3 Optimal Trading Specific Investment -- 2.7 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 3 Effectiveness of Mandatory Disclosure for Consumer Policy -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Verifiable Information |
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3.3 Disclosure of Unverifiable Information -- 3.4 Mandatory Disclosure and Bounded Rationality -- 3.5 The Role of Information Policy and Information Intermediaries -- References -- 4 Ex-ante Regulation, Ex-post Regulation, and Collusion -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Regulation with Monitoring -- 4.2.1 Monitoring and Penalty -- 4.2.2 Action Choice and Optimal Regulation -- 4.3 Ex-post Regulation System -- 4.3.1 Investigation and Signal -- 4.3.2 Optimal Investigation System -- 4.4 Regulation and Collusion -- 4.4.1 Collusion of Investigator and Firm -- 4.4.2 Collusion-Proof Penalty System |
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4.4.3 Collusion-Allowed Penalty System -- 4.4.4 Hierarchical Monitoring System -- 4.5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- 5 Effort Observability and Wage Promotion in an Internal Labor Market -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 Labor in Employment -- 5.2.1 Characteristics of Labor -- 5.2.2 Discretion and Employment -- 5.2.3 The Role of Monitoring -- 5.3 The Model of Wage Promotion in an Internal Market -- 5.3.1 Japanese Internal Labor Market -- 5.4 The Model -- 5.5 Optimal Wage Contract -- 5.6 Efficiency of Promotion System -- 5.7 Concluding Remarks -- References |
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6 Comparative Analysis of Politician-Bureaucratic Governance Structure and Citizens' Preference -- 6.1 Introduction -- 6.2 The Model -- 6.2.1 The Bureaucrats' Utility -- 6.2.2 The Politicians' Utility -- 6.2.3 The Citizens' Utility -- 6.3 The First Best Effort Level and Allocation of Authority -- 6.4 Dominant Politicians System -- 6.4.1 The Bureaucrats' Decision Making -- 6.4.2 The Politicians' Decision Making -- 6.4.3 The Comparative Statics -- 6.4.4 The Comparison with the First-Best -- 6.5 The Case that the Allocation of Authority Is Decided Constitutionally |
| Summary |
This book examines interesting new topics in applied economics from the perspectives of the economics of information and risk, two fields of economics that address the consequences of asymmetric information, environmental risk and uncertainty for the nature and efficiency of interactions between individuals and organizations. In the economics of information, the essential task is to examine the condition of asymmetric information under which the information gap is exploited. For the economics of risk, it is important to investigate types of behavior including risk aversion, risk sharing, and risk prevention, and to reexamine the classical expected utility approach and the relationships among several types of the changes in risk. Few books have ever analyzed topics in applied economics with regard to information and risk. This book provides a comprehensive collection of applied analyses, while also revisiting certain basic concepts in the economics of information and risk. The book consists of two parts. In Part I, several aspects of applied economics are investigated, including public policy, labor economics, and political economics, from the standpoint of the economics of (asymmetric) information. First, several basic frameworks of the incentive mechanism with regard to transaction-specific investment are assessed, then various tools for market design and organization design are explored. In Part II, mathematical measures of risk and risk aversion are examined in more detail, and readers are introduced to stochastic selection rules governing choice behavior under uncertainty. Several types of change in the random variable for the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability distribution function (PDF) are discussed. In closing, the part investigates the comparative static results of these changes in CDF or PDF on the general decision model, incorporating uncertain situations in applied economics |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed April 10, 2020) |
| Subject |
Economics.
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Information science -- Economic aspects
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Risk.
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Economics
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Risk
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economics.
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Public Finance.
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BUSINESS & ECONOMICS.
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Urban & Regional.
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Economic Development.
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Development.
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Economics.
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Financial Services.
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Industries.
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Political Economy.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE.
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Economic Policy.
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Public Policy.
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Regional Studies.
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SOCIAL SCIENCE.
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Economics
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Information science -- Economic aspects
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Risk
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Kim, Iltae, author
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| ISBN |
9789811533006 |
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9811533008 |
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