| Description |
1 online resource |
| Series |
Routledge revivals |
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Routledge revivals.
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| Contents |
Cover; Half Title; Title; Copyright; Contents; Permissions; Acknowledgments; 1 Introduction; The Mind Body Problem; The Nature of the Self; Self and Mind; The Self is a Simple Entity; Neither its Presence nor its Survival is a Matter of Degree; The Identity of the Self; One Self; 2 The Self from the First Person Point of View; The Distinction Between Self and Mind; Phenomenology of Experience; The Self as the Centre of Agency; Direct Experience of the Self as Consciousness; The Subject of Consciousness; A Defence of Pure Consciousness; 3 Unity of Consciousness |
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Unity of Consciousness and the SelfHumean Connections; Thoughts of a Higher Order; Just So"" Stories; A Special Case of Unity of Agency?; Unification by the Brain; Split Brains"" and the Unity of Consciousness; Unity of Person; An Adaptation of Broad's Argument; 4 The Continuity of the Self; Foster's Argument that Co-personality Entails Consubjectivity; Unger's Argument for Shared Experience; Our Knowledge of Our Own Continuity; The Self in Sleep; The Argument for the Non-existence of the Self During Deep Sleep or Coma; The Argument for the Existence of the Self During Sleep and Coma |
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A Summary of the Argument5 Survival; A Misguided Approach; The Priority of the First Person Point of View; Ordinary Survival; Extraordinary Survival; Replicas and Survivors; Fake Survival Exposed; Other Criteria: Parfit's Relation R; Other Criteria: Brennan's S-relation; The Appeal of Psychological Connection; Survival and Identity; Conclusion; Appendix; 6 Fission and Fusion; Fission -- a Metaphysical Possibility?; The Moral Conflict; The Conceivability of Fission; Division of the ""Substantive"" Self; Division of the Mind; Division and the God's Eye View; Presupposing Reductionism |
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A Standard Argument Against the Possibility of FissionFusion; Dipping a Toe into the Conceptual Quagmire; A Summary of the Argument; The Balance of Implausibilities; Two Conclusions; 7 The Physical Criterion for Personal Identity; Why I Cannot Use the Bodily Criterion for an Account of My Own Identity; Psychological Separability: the Body Switching Case; Psychological Separability: Publicly Traceable Reincarnation; Psychological Separability: Disembodiment; Memory and Bodily Continuity; Conclusion; 8 Memory and Self Knowledge; The Argument from Self Recognition; An End to Q-memory? |
| Summary |
First published in 1998, this volume gives an account of personal identity derived from the Butler-Reid position, arguing that from the first person point of view one necessary condition of personal identity is the survival of the Self. Robin Harwood's claim is that a normal human person is a combination of a Self, a mind and a body, locating the issue of personal identity as stemming from the nature of persons as compound entities |
| Notes |
Originally published 1998 by Ashgate Publishing |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed December 27, 2018) |
| Subject |
Self (Philosophy)
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
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PSYCHOLOGY -- Personality.
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Self (Philosophy)
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Identität
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Selbst
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
0429430914 |
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9780429430916 |
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0429774400 |
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9780429774409 |
|
9780429774393 |
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0429774397 |
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