| Description |
1 online resource (566 p.) |
| Series |
Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy Ser |
|
Cambridge Studies in European Law and Policy Ser
|
| Contents |
Cover -- Half-title page -- Series page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- Basic Table of Contents -- Detailed Table of Contents -- List of Figures -- Acknowledgements -- Table of Cases -- Table of Legislation, Treaties and Conventions -- List of Abbreviations -- Part 1 Methods and Introduction -- 1 The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism -- 1.1 An Introduction to European Constitutionalism -- 1.1.1 European Monist Federalism and the Principle of Supremacy -- 1.1.2 The Federation of Sovereign States -- 1.1.3 Constitutional Pluralism |
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1.2 The Constitutional Boundaries of the EU Legal Order -- 1.2.1 Member State Kompetenz-Kompetenz -- 1.2.1.1 Pure Constitutional Evaluation of Member State Kompetenz-Kompetenz Adjudication -- 1.2.1.2 Normative Evaluation of Member State Kompetenz-Kompetenz Adjudication -- 1.2.1.3 Positivist Evaluation of Member State Kompetenz-Kompetenz Adjudication -- 1.2.2 Member State Constitutional Identity -- 1.2.2.1 Pure Constitutional Evaluation of Constitutional Identity Review -- 1.2.2.2 Normative Evaluation of Constitutional Identity Review |
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1.2.2.3 Positivist Evaluation of Constitutional Identity Review -- 1.3 The Constitutional Boundaries of European Fiscal Federalism -- 1.3.1 Fiscal Sovereignty -- 1.3.1.1 Three Tests for Fiscal Sovereignty -- 1.3.1.2 Unlawful Restrictions on Fiscal Sovereignty -- 1.3.1.3 Unlawful Conferral of Fiscal Sovereignty -- 1.3.1.4 Unlawful Impairments of Fiscal Sovereignty -- 1.3.1.5 Permissible Limitations on Fiscal Sovereignty -- 1.3.2 Price Stability and Fiscal Discipline -- 1.3.2.1 Price Stability -- 1.3.2.2 Fiscal Discipline: Sound Budgetary Policies and a Sustainable Balance of Payments |
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1.4 Conclusions: Permanent Constraints on European Fiscal Federalism -- 2 The Maastricht Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism -- 2.1 The Teleology of European Economic and Monetary Union -- 2.2 The Principles of Economic and Monetary Union -- 2.2.1 Price Stability -- 2.2.2 Fiscal Discipline -- 2.2.3 Fiscal Sovereignty -- 2.2.4 Market Discipline -- 2.3 The Legal Architecture of European Fiscal Federalism -- 2.3.1 Articles 123-125 TFEU: The Prohibition on Financial Assistance -- 2.3.1.1 Article 125 TFEU: The 'No Bailout' Rule -- 2.3.1.2 Article 123 TFEU: The No Monetary Financing Rule |
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2.3.1.3 Article 124 TFEU: No Privileged Access to Private Finance -- 2.3.1.4 Article 122 TFEU: (No) Conditional Financial Assistance -- 2.3.2 Article 121 TFEU: The Multilateral Surveillance Procedure (MSP) -- 2.3.3 Article 126 TFEU: The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) -- 2.4 Conclusions: The Maastricht Architecture -- 3 The Failure and Abrogation of the Maastricht Model -- 3.1 Sovereign Debt Yields and the Failure of the Prohibition on Financial Assistance -- 3.1.1 Nominal Interest-Rate Convergence -- 3.1.2 The Interest Rate Channel and the Bailout Expectation |
| Summary |
Explores the proposed models of fiscal federalism that are compatible with the constitutional boundaries of the European legal order |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
|
3.1.3 Low and Negative Real Interest Rates |
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9781108905886 |
|
1108905889 |
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