| Description |
1 online resource ; illustrations, tables |
| Contents |
The expected utility of insurance -- The mechanisms of insurance -- Examining insurace across regime types -- Integrating de jure independence |
| Summary |
Why do political actors tolerate courts able to check their power? This book argues that judicial independence as electorally-induced 'insurance' is about the risks of losing power, risks that are higher in autocratic regimes. Using a mixed-methods approach, it develops a theory of both de facto and de jure independence across regime type |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from digital title page (Oxford scholarship online, viewed on July 31, 2020) |
| Subject |
Judicial independence.
|
|
Judicial power.
|
|
Justice, Administration of -- Political aspects.
|
|
Judicial independence
|
|
Judicial power
|
|
Justice, Administration of -- Political aspects
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| ISBN |
9780192583642 |
|
0192583646 |
|
9780191880384 |
|
0191880388 |
|
9780192583659 |
|
0192583654 |
|
