Description |
1 online resource (321 pages) |
Series |
Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy Ser |
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Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy Ser
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Contents |
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Note on Contributors -- Introduction -- PART 1: Memory and Imagination: Ontological Questions -- PART 2: Memory, Imagination, Justification, and Perspective -- PART 3: Memory, Imagination, Skills, and Abilities -- PART 4: Memory, Imagination, and Emotion -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Part I: Memory and Imagination: Ontological Questions -- Chapter 1: Remembering and Imagining: The Attitudinal Continuity -- 1 Introduction: Remembering as a Mental Attitude -- 2 The Explanatory Role of Attitudes |
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3 Understanding Remembering as an Attitude: First Steps -- 4 The Binary Approach to the Attitude of Remembering -- 5 Coninuism versus Discontinuism in Attitudinal Accounts of Remembering -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 2: Memory and Imagination, Minds and Worlds -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Directions of Fit -- 3 Episodic Memory and Direction of Fit -- 4 Experiential Imagination and Direction of Fit -- 5 Directions of Fit and the (Dis)Continuism Debate -- 6 Conclusion -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References |
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Chapter 3: Imagining the Actual vs. Possible Future: An Argument for Discontinuism of Collective Mental Time Travel -- 1 Introduction -- 2 On the Modal Difference between Memory and Future-Directed Imagination -- 3 Collective Memory as Shared Memory: An Argument for Collective Discontinuism -- 4 Is Collective Future-Directed Imagination Shared Imagination? Three Rival Analyses -- 5 Conclusion and Outlook -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: If Remembering Is Imagining, Then What Is Forgetting? -- 1 Introduction: Simulationism and Forgetting -- 2 Retrieval Vagueness -- 3 Defining Forgetting |
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4 Mechanisms of Forgetting -- 5 The Extent of Forgetting -- 6 Conclusion: Simulationism and Infantile Amnesia -- Acknowledgements -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 5: Relationism about Memory? -- 1 Types of Memory and Relationism -- 2 Two Forms of Relationism and the Problems They Face -- 3 Problems for Non-representational Relationism about Particular Sensuous Memory -- 4 Representational Relationism and the Motivations for Relationism -- 4.1 Epistemological Authority of Particular Sensuous Memory -- 4.1.1 Narrative and Past Familiarity -- 4.1.2 Mode of Awareness |
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4.1.3 Representation of Particular Experience -- 4.1.4 Reflexive Content -- 4.1.5 Activation Routines as Representational Properties -- 4.2 Memory Demonstratives -- 4.3 Implications for the Continuity between Sensuous Memory and Imagination -- 5 Concluding Remarks -- References -- Part 2: Memory, Imagination, Justification, and Perspective -- Chapter 6: On the Putative Epistemic Generativity of Memory and Imagination -- 1 Introduction -- 2 APG -- 3 Epistemic Generativity and Epistemic Preservativity -- 4 Epistemically Generative Memory? -- 4.1 The First Horn: No Justification |
Notes |
4.1.1 Imagination Inflation |
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Print version record |
Form |
Electronic book
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Author |
Vendrell Ferran, Íngrid
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ISBN |
9781000785753 |
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1000785750 |
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