| Description |
1 online resource (272 pages) |
| Contents |
Cover; Half Title; Title Page; Copyright Page; Dedication; Contents; List of Tables; Acknowledgments; Prologue; 1 Introduction: Israel, the Stubborn Partner; PART ONE THE PEACEMAKERS; 2 International Interests in a Stabilized Middle East; Preventing Superpower Confrontation; Reducing Soviet Influence in the Middle East; Protecting Oil Supplies to the Western Allies and Japan; Easing the Strain in U.S. Relations with Its Western Allies and Japan; Protecting Israel; Promoting Human Rights for the Palestinians; PART TWO BEYOND CAMP DAVID; 3 A New Beginning: The Reagan Initiative |
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Political BackgroundThe Reagan Administration's Motivation; The Reagan Plan; Israeli Reaction; 4 The First Alternative: Secretary Shultz's Initiative; Political Background: From the Reagan Plan to the Intifada; The Reagan Administration's Motivation; The Shultz Initiative, March 4, 1988; The International Conferences Idea; Israeli Reaction; 5 Another Approach: The Baker Peace Initiative; The U.S.-PLO Dialogue; The Shamir-Rabin Peace Plan; Mubarak's Peace Initiative; The Baker Plan; Israeli Reaction; 6 The Final Building Block: The Madrid Conference; Background and Motivation |
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The Madrid InitiativeIsraeli Reaction to the Gulf War and to the Postwar U.S. Peace Initiative; The Madrid Conference: Ten Rounds of Futile Negotiations; 7 The Breakthrough: The Oslo Connection; Background and Motivation; The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the Cold War; Shortcomings of the Washington Talks; The Clinton Administration's Pro-Israeli Stand; European Involvement; The Defeat of Saddam Hussein; Conditions in the Territories; The Reemergence of Labor as the Leading Party in Israel; The Survival of Rabin's Coalition; Israel's Self-Confidence; The Gaza-Jericho Plan |
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Israeli ReactionPART THREE THE ISRAELI DOMESTIC SCENE; 8 The Domestic Debate over Peace, Security, and Territorial Rights; The System of Government and Factional Divisions; Territorial Compromise; Nonterritorial Compromise; Annexation and Transfer; Factional Division and Election Campaigns; 9 The Growth of the Israeli Right: The Emergence of Gush Emunim and the Rise of the Likud; The Effect of the Six-Day War: The Revitalization of Revisionist Zionism; Religious Awakening and the Rise of Messianic Nationalism; The Rise and Influence of Gush Emunim |
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The 1977 Elections and the Likud's Rise to PowerCollaboration Between Likud and Gush Emunim and the Strengthening of the Right, ; 10 The First Fallout: The Near Collapse of the National Unity Government; The Political Crisis over the International Conference Plan; The Influence of the Israeli Right on the Domestic Debate; 11 The Second Fallout: The Collapse of the National Unity Government; Reaction to the Shamir-Rabin Plan; Reaction to Mubarak's and Baker's Proposals; 12 The End of Likud's Domination; 13 The Road to Peace; APPENDIXES |
| Summary |
An in-depth study of the effects of Israels internal struggles on the Arab-Israeli peace process, this book examines how Israels leaders and citizens have reacted to the various proposals in the postCamp David era, from the 1982 Reagan plan to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. The author examines the dramatic consequences of the peace process, including the ultimate fall of the NUG in 1990, and shows how the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War encouraged negotiations. }An in-depth study of the effects of Israels internal struggles on the Arab-Israeli peace process, this book examines how Israels leaders and citizens have reacted to the various proposals in the postCamp David era, including the 1982 Reagan plan, the 1988 Shultz initiative, and the 1989 Mubarak and Baker plans. Ziva Flamhaft also analyzes reactions to the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 1993. Focusing on the domestic political scene, she exposes the efforts of the Israeli political right to undermine the peace process and illuminates the dramatic consequences of that processthe reaction of Prime Minister Begin to the Reagan plan, the near collapse of the National Unity Government (NUG) in 1987-88, and the ultimate fall of the NUG in 1990 as a result of the Baker plan. Flamhaft then looks at how the end of the Cold War and the Gulf War helped to encourage negotiations and evaluates why the Likud Party was replaced by Labor in 1992. Finally, Flamhaft demonstrates the futility of third-party mediation when negotiations are rejected domestically and discusses the essential conditions required for effective mediation. } |
| Notes |
Appendix A: The Israeli Government Peace Initiative, May 14, 1989 |
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Print version record |
| Subject |
Arab-Israeli conflict -- 1973-1993.
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Arab-Israeli conflict.
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Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Essays.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Government -- General.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Government -- National.
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POLITICAL SCIENCE -- Reference.
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HISTORY -- Middle East -- General.
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Arab-Israeli conflict
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Diplomatic negotiations in international disputes
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Politics and government
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| SUBJECT |
Israel -- Politics and government. http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85068700
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| Subject |
Israel
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780429499562 |
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0429499566 |
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9780429979194 |
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0429979193 |
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