| Description |
xxxv, 445 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm |
| Series |
Global financial markets |
| Contents |
Contents note continued: 10.4.1.Germany -- 10.4.2.Italy -- 10.4.3.Spain -- 10.4.4.France -- 10.4.5.Scandinavia -- 10.5.Market for corporate takeovers -- 10.5.1.Germany -- 10.5.2.Italy -- 10.5.3.Spain -- 10.5.4.France -- 10.5.5.Scandinavia -- 11.Corporate Governance in the BRICS -- 11.1.Introduction -- 11.2.Corporate governance in Brazil -- 11.2.1.The board of directors -- 11.2.2.The audit committee and the fiscal board -- 11.2.3.The independent auditor -- 11.2.4.The shareholders' rights -- 11.2.5.The financial statements' disclosure -- 11.2.6.Market for corporate takeovers -- 11.3.Corporate governance in Russia -- 11.3.1.The board structure -- 11.3.2.Internal control and external auditing -- 11.3.3.Shareholder derivative action -- 11.3.4.Market for corporate takeover -- 11.4.Corporate governance in India -- 11.4.1.The board of directors -- 11.4.2.The audit committee -- 11.4.3.Disclosure of transactions with subsidiaries -- 11.4.4.Disclosure of corporate transactions -- |
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Contents note continued: 11.4.4.1.Certification of the company financial statements -- 11.4.5.Shareholder derivative action -- 11.4.6.Market for corporate takeover -- 11.4.7.India's corporate governance challenges -- 11.5.Corporate governance in China -- 11.5.1.The principal-to-principal relationship -- 11.5.2.Corporate management in China -- 11.5.2.1.The board of directors -- 11.5.2.2.The supervisory board -- 11.5.3.Shareholder derivative action -- 11.5.4.Market for corporate takeover -- 11.6.Corporate governance in South Africa -- 11.6.1.The board of directors -- 11.6.2.The stakeholders' rights -- 11.6.3.The external auditor -- 11.6.4.Alternative dispute resolution -- 11.6.5.Shareholder derivative action -- 11.6.6.Market for corporate takeover -- 12.Corporate Governance in Saudi Arabia -- 12.1.General -- 12.2.The board of directors -- 12.2.1.The structure of the board -- 12.2.2.Responsibilities of the board -- 12.2.3.Board's committees -- 12.3.The shareholders' rights -- |
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Contents note continued: 12.4.Information and disclosure -- 12.5.Executive compensation -- 12.6.Shareholder derivative action -- 12.7.Market for corporate takeover -- 12.8.Conclusion -- pt. II Audit Roles -- 13.Internal Audit Process -- 13.1.General -- 13.2.Internal audit v. external audit -- 13.2.1.The internal auditor -- 13.2.2.The external auditor -- 13.3.The internal audit attribute standards -- 13.3.1.The purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal auditor -- 13.3.2.The independence and objectivity of the auditor -- 13.3.3.The appropriate training -- 13.3.4.Due professional care -- 13.3.5.Quality assurance and improvement programs -- 13.3.6.Professional skepticism -- 13.4.The internal audit performance standards -- 13.4.1.The engagement planning -- 13.4.2.The scope of the engagement -- 13.4.3.The performance of the engagement -- 13.4.4.The disclosure of the audit -- 13.4.5.The monitoring process -- 14.The US Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Audit Profession -- |
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Contents note continued: 14.1.General -- 14.2.The PCAOB -- 14.2.1.The PCAOB responsibilities -- 14.2.1.1.Registration of accounting firms -- 14.2.1.2.Inspections of registered public accounting firms -- 14.2.1.3.Establishment of auditing standards -- 14.2.1.4.Investigation and discipline of registered public accounting -- 14.2.2.The PCAOB enforcement role -- 14.3.The audit committee -- 14.3.1.Further reading -- 15.The Integrated Audit Process -- 15.1.General -- 15.2.Audit of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) -- 15.2.1.Planning the audit -- 15.2.1.1.Role of risk assessment -- 15.2.1.2.Addressing the risk of fraud -- 15.2.1.3.Using the work of others -- 15.2.2.The auditor's approach -- 15.2.2.1.Identifying entity-level controls -- 15.2.2.2.Identifying significant accounts and disclosures and their relevant assertions -- 15.2.2.3.Understanding likely sources of misstatement -- 15.2.2.4.Selecting controls to test -- 15.2.3.Testing controls -- |
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Contents note continued: 15.2.3.1.Nature of tests of controls -- 15.2.3.2.Evaluating identified deficiencies -- 15.2.4.Wrapping-up -- 15.2.5.Reporting on internal control -- 15.3.Audit of financial statements -- 15.3.1.Planning -- 15.3.2.Sample testing -- 15.3.2.1.Sample risk in substantive tests of details -- 15.3.2.2.Sample risk in tests of controls -- 15.3.2.3.Dual-purpose sample -- 15.3.3.Controls and transactions testing -- 15.3.4.Disclosure of testing -- 15.3.5.Issuance of the audit report -- 15.3.5.1.An unqualified opinion -- 15.3.5.2.A qualified opinion -- 15.3.5.3.An adverse opinion -- 15.3.5.4.A disclaimer of opinion -- 15.4.The ongoing concern report -- 16.Audit of Group Financial Statements -- 16.1.General -- 16.2.Audit strategy and audit plan -- 16.2.1.The group engagement team assuming responsibility -- 16.2.2.The group engagement team not assuming responsibility -- 16.3.Independence and competence of the component auditor -- |
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Contents note continued: 16.4.Assessment of materiality in group audit -- 16.4.1.Assessment of the component financial framework -- 16.4.2.Communication with a component auditor -- 16.5.Audit test related to group audit -- 16.5.1.Audit test for not-significant components -- 16.5.2.Audit test for significant components -- 16.6.The evaluation of the sufficiency and appropriateness of audit evidence -- 16.7.Communication between the lead audit and the group -- 16.7.1.Communication between the lead auditor and the group management -- 16.7.2.Communication between the lead auditor and the governance team -- 16.8.Documenting a group audit -- 16.9.The consolidation process -- 16.10.Conclusion -- 17.The European Union Statutory Audit Directive -- 17.1.General -- 17.2.Approval, education, practical training, and continuing training -- 17.2.1.Approval of statutory auditors or audit firms -- 17.2.2.Educational qualification -- 17.2.3.Continuing education -- |
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Contents note continued: 17.3.Registration, appointment and dismissal -- 17.3.1.For natural person auditors -- 17.3.2.For audit firms -- 17.4.Professional ethics, independence, objectivity, confidentiality -- 17.4.1.Professional ethics -- 17.4.2.Independence and objectivity -- 17.4.3.Confidentiality and professional secrecy -- 17.4.4.Auditing fees -- 17.5.Auditing standards and audit reporting -- 17.5.1.Auditing standards -- 17.5.2.Audit reporting -- 17.6.Quality assurance and auditors' liability -- 17.6.1.Quality assurance -- 17.6.2.Auditors' liability -- 17.7.Public oversight and arrangements between member states -- 17.7.1.Public oversight -- 17.7.2.Arrangements between member states -- 17.8.Statutory audits of public-interest entities -- 17.8.1.Transparency report -- 17.8.2.Audit committee -- 17.9.Approval of auditors from third countries -- 18.The Accounting and Auditing ROSC -- 18.1.General -- 18.2.ROSC corporate governance -- 18.2.1.Objectives -- 18.2.2.Methodology -- |
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Contents note continued: 18.2.3.Assessment -- 18.2.4.Final report -- 18.2.5.Shortcomings of the assessment -- 18.3.ROSC corporate governance and shareholder protection index -- 18.4.ROSC accounting and auditing -- 18.4.1.Objectives -- 18.4.2.Methodology -- 18.4.3.Assessment -- 18.4.4.Final report -- 18.5.Shortcomings of the assessments -- 18.5.1.Lack of guidance -- 18.5.2.Misunderstandings as to the nature of international standards -- 18.5.3.Lack of appropriate mechanisms for granting national authority to international standards -- 18.5.4.Inconsistencies between international standards and the legal framework -- 18.5.5.Lack of appropriate linkages between general-purpose financial reporting and regulatory reporting -- 18.5.6.Inappropriate scope of application of international standards -- 18.5.7.Non-observability of compliance -- 18.5.8.Improving the standards themselves -- 18.5.9.Mismatch between accounting and auditing requirements and market demands -- |
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Contents note continued: 18.5.10.Mismatch between accounting and auditing requirements and the capacity to comply -- 18.5.11.Mismatch between accounting and auditing requirements and domestic enforcement capacity -- 18.5.12.The special role of the international audit firm networks -- 18.6.The Saudi Arabia accounting ROSC -- 18.7.The US financial markets assessment -- 18.7.1.Introduction and methodology -- 18.7.2.Preconditions for effective securities regulation -- 18.7.3.Main findings -- 18.7.3.1.Assessments of IOSCO principles -- 18.7.4.Authorities' response to the assessment -- 18.8.Conclusion -- 19.Corporate Governance, Accounting and Auditing Scandals -- 19.1.General -- 19.2.The triangle of fraud -- 19.2.1.Pressure or incentive -- 19.2.2.Opportunity -- 19.2.3.Rationalization of fraudulent behavior -- 19.3.Scandals in the US -- 19.3.1.The Enron scandal (auditor: Arthur Andersen) -- 19.3.2.The Bristol-Myers Squibb scandal (auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers) -- |
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Contents note continued: 19.3.3.The WorldCom scandal (auditor: Arthur Andersen) -- 19.3.4.The Waste Management scandal (auditor: Arthur Andersen) -- 19.3.5.The Adelphia scandal (auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers) -- 19.3.6.The AIG scandal (auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers) -- 19.3.7.The Tyco scandal (auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers) -- 19.3.8.The HealthSouth scandal (auditor: Ernst & Young) -- 19.3.9.The New Century Financial case (auditor: KPMG) -- 19.4.Scandals in Canada -- 19.4.1.The Bre-X scandal (auditor: Deloitte & Touche) -- 19.4.2.The Hollinger scandal (auditor: KPMG) -- 19.4.3.The Nortel scandal (auditor: Deloitte & Touche) -- 19.5.Scandals in the European Union -- 19.5.1.The Parmalat scandal (auditors: Deloitte & Touche and Grant Thornton) -- 19.5.2.The BCCI scandal (auditors: Price Waterhouse and Ernst & Young) -- 19.6.Scandals in Asia-Pacific -- 19.6.1.Japan -- 19.6.1.1.The Kanebo scandal (auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)) -- |
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Contents note continued: 19.6.1.2.The Olympus Corporation scandal (auditor: Hideo Yamada) -- 19.6.1.3.The Livedoor case (auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers) -- 19.6.2.India: the Satyam scandal (auditor: PricewaterhouseCoopers) -- 19.6.3.China: the Sino-Forest scandal (auditors: Ernst & Young and BDO) -- 19.6.4.Australia -- 19.6.4.1.The One.Tel scandal (auditor: Ernst & Young) -- 19.6.4.2.The HIH Insurance scandal (auditor: Arthur Andersen) -- 19.6.5.Scandals in South Africa -- 19.6.5.1.The Macmed scandal (auditor: Deloitte & Touche) -- 19.6.5.2.The LeisureNet scandal (auditors: Deloitte & Touche) -- 19.7.Diagnosis of the scandals -- 19.7.1.Corporate greed -- 19.7.2.Unfettered deregulation -- 19.7.3.Excessive compensation -- 19.7.4.Ineffective boards of directors -- 19.7.5.Lack of continuous training -- 20.Auditor Legal Liability -- 20.1.General -- 20.2.Auditor contractual liability: the engagement letter -- 20.3.Auditor common law tort liability -- 20.3.1.Duty -- |
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Contents note continued: 20.3.2.Breach of duty -- 20.3.3.Injury, loss, or damages -- 20.3.4.Causation -- 20.4.Auditor liabilities vis-a-vis third-party claimants -- 20.4.1.The privity approach -- 20.4.2.The near privity approach -- 20.4.3.The restatement of torts approach -- 20.4.4.The foreseeability approach -- 20.5.The auditor defenses -- 20.5.1.The in pari delicto: an equitable defense -- 20.5.1.1.The rationale -- 20.5.1.2.The adverse interest exception -- 20.5.1.3.Inconsistencies of the defense: conflicts among states -- 20.5.1.4.Imputation - AHERF -- 20.5.2.The absence of negligence -- 20.5.3.The contributory negligence doctrine -- 20.5.4.The comparative negligence doctrine -- 20.6.Auditor federal statutory liability -- 20.6.1.The Securities Act of 1933 -- 20.6.2.The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 -- 20.6.3.The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 -- 20.6.4.The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) -- 20.6.5.The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 -- |
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Contents note continued: 20.7.Auditor state liability -- 20.8.Auditor criminal liability -- 20.9.Conclusion -- 21.The Future of Auditing -- 21.1.General -- 21.2.The inadequacy of the big-four business model -- 21.2.1.The regulators -- 21.2.2.The investors -- 21.2.3.The academics -- 21.2.4.The public -- 21.3.Rethinking the IFRS -- 21.4.Enhancing the education and training of the twenty-first century auditors -- 21.5.Reforming the immunization rules against liability -- 21.6.Enhancing the auditor curriculum -- 21.6.1.Related party transactions -- 21.6.2.Auditing estimates -- 21.7.Conclusion -- pt. III Board Oversight -- 22.Risk management -- 22.1.General -- 22.2.Sources of board risk oversight function -- 22.2.1.Laws of fiduciary duties -- 22.2.2.Federal laws and regulations -- 22.2.3.The SEC -- 22.2.4.The best practice codes -- 22.3.Objectives of risk management -- 22.4.The risk management principles -- 22.5.Types of corporate risk management -- 22.5.1.Strategic risk -- |
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Contents note continued: 22.5.2.Operational risk -- 22.5.3.Compliance risk -- 22.5.3.1.Anti-Corruption Act -- 22.5.3.2.US money laundering -- 22.5.3.3.US health and environmental concerns -- 22.5.4.Financial risk -- 22.5.4.1.Why organizations should hedge -- 22.5.4.2.Why organizations should not hedge -- 22.5.5.Choice of instruments -- 22.5.5.1.Natural hedges -- 22.5.5.2.Financial hedge instruments -- 23.Management Fraud -- 23.1.General -- 23.2.Motives for financial statements fraud -- 23.2.1.Incentives -- 23.2.2.Pressures -- 23.2.3.Opportunities -- 23.3.Types of management frauds -- 23.3.1.Intentional manipulation of financial statements -- 23.3.2.Misappropriation of tangible or intangible assets -- 23.3.3.Corruption -- 23.4.Management fraud indicators -- 23.4.1.Changes in accounting methods or policies -- 23.4.2.Aggressive use of GAAP options -- 23.5.Detection and prevention of management fraud -- 23.5.1.Detection of management fraud -- 23.5.2.Prevention of management fraud -- |
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Contents note continued: 23.6.Management fraud antecedents -- 23.6.1.Koss Corp. Coffers Co-Opted -- 23.6.2.PBS&J Corp., Miami, Florida -- 23.7.Changing the management culture -- 24.The Audit Committee and Management Fraud -- 24.1.General -- 24.2.Roles and functions of the audit committee -- 24.3.Communication between the audit committee and the auditor -- 24.3.1.Appointment and retention -- 24.3.2.Accounting policies and practices, estimates, and significant unusual transactions -- 24.3.3.Auditor's evaluation of the quality of the company's financial reporting -- 24.3.4.Other information in documents containing audited financial statements -- 24.4.Audit committee legal liabilities -- 24.5.Conclusion -- 24.5.1.General conclusion -- Appendices -- 1.The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance -- 2.OECD Principles -- Assessment Matrix -- 3.Report of the New York Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance -- 4.German Corporate Governance Code -- |
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Contents note continued: 3.8.Accountability, transparency at the IMF -- 3.8.1.Accountability -- 3.8.2.Transparency -- 3.8.3.Performance criteria (PC) -- 3.8.4.Program reviews (PRs) -- 3.8.5.Prior actions (PAs) -- 3.8.6.Structural adjustments (SAs) -- 3.9.Conclusion -- 3.9.1.Supplementary reading -- 4.The World Bank and Corporate Governance -- 4.1.General -- 4.2.Organizational structure of the World Bank -- 4.2.1.The Board of Governors -- 4.2.2.The Board of Directors -- 4.2.3.The Office of the President -- 4.2.4.The inadequacy of the World Bank governance -- 4.3.The aims of the World Bank -- 4.4.Reforming the World Bank governance structure -- 4.4.1.Voting rights -- 4.4.2.Representation to the executive board -- 4.5.The World Bank assessment of member states -- 4.6.Towards a World Bank for the twenty-first century -- 4.6.1.The protection of the minorities -- 4.6.2.The alteration of the voting rights -- 4.6.3.The establishment of an independent OIE -- |
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Contents note continued: 3.The IMF Corporate Governance -- 3.1.General -- 3.2.Current organizational structure of the IMF -- 3.2.1.The executive board -- 3.2.2.The board of governors -- 3.2.3.The international monetary and financial committee -- 3.2.4.The management -- 3.2.5.The Joint IMF---World Bank Development Committee -- 3.2.6.The Independent Evaluation Office -- 3.2.7.Inadequacy of the IMF governance -- 3.3.Reforming the IMF corporate governance -- 3.3.1.An open and meritocratic process for leadership position -- 3.3.2.A review of the quotas at the IMF -- 3.3.2.1.Subscription -- 3.3.2.2.Voting power -- 3.3.2.3.Access to financing -- 3.3.3.An expansion of double majority systems of decision making -- 3.4.The IMF goals -- 3.5.The key functions of the IMF -- 3.5.1.Surveillance -- 3.5.2.Financing -- 3.5.3.Technical assistance -- 3.6.Categories of IMF lending -- 3.6.1.Concessional loans -- 3.6.2.Non-concessional loans -- 3.7.The IMF corporate governance strategy -- |
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Contents note continued: 4.6.4.Changing the auditing process of the World Bank activities -- 4.7.Conclusion -- 4.7.1.Supplementary reading -- 5.Corporate Governance in the United States of America -- 5.1.General -- 5.2.The agency approach -- 5.2.1.The board fiduciary duties -- 5.2.1.1.Duty of care -- 5.2.1.2.Duty of loyalty -- 5.2.1.3.Good faith conduct -- 5.2.2.The safeguards: the business judgment rules -- 5.2.3.Limited shareholders' rights -- 5.2.4.Reforming the BJR -- 5.3.The flaws and inadequacies of the agency approach -- 5.3.1.Conflict of interests -- 5.3.2.Corporate defensive tactics -- 5.3.2.1.Poison pill -- 5.3.2.2.The staggered board techniques -- 5.4.The financial and accounting framework: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act -- 5.4.1.Section 302: corporate responsibility for financial reports -- 5.4.2.Section 404: Assessment of internal control -- 5.4.3.Section 906: Certification of compliance with the SEC -- 5.4.4.Section 101: The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board -- |
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Contents note continued: 5.4.5.Section 301: Independent financial expert in the board -- 5.4.6.Section 1101: Corporate tax returns -- 5.5.Shareholders' limited corporate governance rights -- 5.5.1.Limited rights compared to other developed systems -- 5.5.2.Shareholders' derivative litigation: a hurdle race -- 5.6.Reforming the system: more checks and balances -- 5.6.1.New standard of liability -- 5.6.2.Recognition of the role of employees -- 5.6.3.Compensation system -- 5.6.4.Dismantling the board group-think culture -- 5.6.5.Reforming the federal judicial system -- 5.7.Conclusion -- 6.Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom -- 6.1.Introduction -- 6.2.The development of corporate governance in the UK -- 6.2.1.The Cadbury Report (1992) -- 6.2.2.The Greenbury Report (1995) -- 6.2.3.The Hampel Report (1998) -- 6.2.4.The Turnbull Report (1999) -- 6.2.5.The Higgs Report (2003) -- 6.2.6.The Tyson Report (2003) -- 6.2.7.The Revised Combined Code (2008) -- |
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Contents note continued: 5.Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance -- 6.Sample Audit Engagement Letter -- 7.Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm -- 8.Auditor Report with an Emphasis-of-Matter Paragraph -- 9.Auditor Report with an Other-Matter Paragraph -- 10.Sample of an Unqualified Opinion on Management's Assessment of the Effectiveness of Internal Control over Financial Reporting and an Adverse Opinion on the Effectiveness of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Because of the Existence of a Material Weakness -- 11.Sample of Report Disclaiming an Opinion on Management's Assessment of the Effectiveness of Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Disclaiming an Opinion on the Effectiveness of Internal Control over Financial Reporting because of a Limitation on the scope of the audit -- 12.Financial Ratios -- 13.The ROSC Standards and Codes -- 14.Wal Mart Stores Inc. Strategic Planning and Finance Committee Charter |
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Contents note continued: 6.3.The UK corporate governance approach -- 6.3.1.Corporate takeover -- 6.3.2.Call special meetings and amend the corporate charter -- 6.3.3.Removal of directors without cause -- 6.4.The role, functions, and remunerations of the board -- 6.4.1.The chairman -- 6.4.2.The board -- 6.5.The board accountability, internal control, and audit -- 6.6.The board relationship with the shareholders -- 6.7.Shareholder derivative action -- 6.8.The takeover market for corporate control -- 6.9.The pros and cons of the UK approach -- 7.Corporate Governance in Canada -- 7.1.General -- 7.2.The board duties -- 7.2.1.Duty to manage -- 7.2.2.Duty of loyalty or the fiduciary obligations -- 7.2.3.Duty of care -- 7.3.Role, functions, and remuneration of the board -- 7.3.1.The role and the functions -- 7.3.2.Audit committee -- 7.3.3.The remuneration of the board -- 7.4.Assessment of Duties -- 7.4.1.The proper purpose doctrine -- 7.4.2.The Business Judgment Rule (BJR) -- |
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Contents note continued: 7.5.Shareholders' rights -- 7.6.The board relationship with stakeholders -- 7.6.1.Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v. Wise -- 7.6.2.BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders -- 7.7.The market for corporate takeover -- 7.7.1.Takeover regulations -- 7.7.2.Takeovers defensive tactics -- 7.8.Conclusion -- 8.Corporate Governance in Australasia -- 8.1.General -- 8.2.Corporate governance in Australia -- 8.2.1.The ̀comply or explain' approach -- 8.2.2.The board of directors -- 8.2.3.The shareholders' rights -- 8.2.4.Integrity of financial reporting -- 8.2.5.The risk management process -- 8.2.6.Remuneration -- 8.3.Corporate governance in New Zealand -- 8.3.1.The board of directors -- 8.3.2.The audit committee -- 8.3.3.The remuneration committee -- 8.3.4.The nomination committee -- 8.4.Shareholder derivative action in Australia -- 8.5.Shareholder derivative action in New Zealand -- 8.6.Market for corporate takeovers in Australia -- |
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Contents note continued: 8.6.1.The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) -- 8.6.2.The Takeovers Panel -- 8.7.Market for corporate takeovers in New Zealand -- 8.8.Conclusion -- 9.Corporate Governance in Japan -- 9.1.General -- 9.2.The purpose of the corporation in Japan -- 9.3.The structure of the Japanese corporation -- 9.3.1.Independent directors -- 9.3.2.The corporate auditor system -- 9.4.Board compensation -- 9.5.Shareholder derivative action -- 9.6.Market for corporate takeovers -- 9.6.1.The CVSG -- 9.6.2.The Tokyo Securities Exchange (TSE) -- 9.6.3.The Judicial -- 9.6.3.1.The Bull Dog Sauce -- 9.7.Shareholders rights -- 9.8.Conclusion -- 10.Corporate Governance in Continental Europe -- 10.1.General -- 10.2.Board structures -- 10.2.1.The two-tier structure -- 10.2.2.The unitary board -- 10.3.Executive compensation -- 10.3.1.The compensation committee approach -- 10.3.2.The government-capping approach (France) -- 10.4.Shareholder derivative action -- |
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Machine generated contents note: pt. I Comparative Corporate Governance -- 1.Corporate Governance Framework -- 1.1.General -- 1.2.The legal framework -- 1.3.The political framework -- 1.4.The economic framework -- 1.5.Corporate governance structure -- 1.5.1.The concentrated corporate governance structure -- 1.5.2.The diluted corporate governance structure -- 1.6.Corporate governance core principles -- 1.6.1.Fairness -- 1.6.2.Accountability -- 1.6.3.Responsibility -- 1.6.4.Transparency -- 1.7.The irony of corporate governance -- 1.8.The shortness of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model -- 1.9.Toward a network corporate governance model -- 2.The OECD Corporate Governance Principles -- 2.1.General -- 2.2.The OECD core principles -- 2.2.1.The six OECD principles on corporate governance -- 2.2.2.The inefficiency of the six OECD principles -- 2.3.The future of the OECD guidelines -- 2.3.1.Partnership structure -- 2.3.2.Family businesses -- 2.4.Conclusion -- |
| Summary |
Recent global economic crisis highlighted importance of strong corporate governance systems. The failure of many 'gatekeepers' (i.e. auditors) to protect efficiency of financial markets has left many wondering whether there exists a sound model of corporate governance and if so, what the features of such a model are |
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Recent global economic crisis highlighted importance of strong corporate governance systems. The failure of many 'gatekeepers' (i.e. auditors) to protect efficiency of financial markets has left many wondering whether there exists a sound model of corporate governance and if so, what the features of such a model are. Aust & NZ content |
| Notes |
Formerly CIP. Uk |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Subject |
Boards of directors.
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Business and management
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Corporate governance -- Law and legislation.
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Corporate governance.
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Corporations -- Auditing -- Law and legislation.
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| LC no. |
2013492302 |
| ISBN |
9781137360007 (hbk.) |
