| Description |
1 online resource (218 p.) |
| Contents |
Cover -- Talking About: An Intentionalist Theory of Reference -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Epigraph -- Introduction -- Confusion and Propositional Attitudes -- Mental Mechanisms and the Act of Referring -- Edenic Intentionalism -- 1: Attitude Ascriptions and Frege's Curse -- 1.1 A Puzzle about Identity -- 1.2 Dissolving Frege -- 1.3 Attitude Ascriptions -- 1.4 Questioning Attitudes -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2: The State of Confusion -- 2.1 Two Models of Confusion -- The Belief Model -- The Concept Model -- 2.2 Unavailable Representations -- 2.3 The Belief Model |
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2.4 Descriptive and Explanatory Adequacy -- 2.5 Conclusion -- 3: Representational Acts and Implicit Attitudes -- 3.1 Representational States and Acts -- 3.2 The Contribution of Action -- 3.3 Profoundly Implicit Beliefs -- 3.3.1 Nonconceptual and Subdoxastic Representation -- 3.3.2 Mismatch in the Content-Part -- 3.3.3 Mismatch in the Attitude-Part -- 3.4 Conclusion -- 4: Intention or Easy Meanings? -- 4.1 A Preface to a Theory -- 4.2 The Expressionist Challenge -- 4.3 Intending to Express a Thought -- 4.4 The Expressionist Collapse -- 4.5 Conclusion -- 5: Explanation, Mechanism, and Function |
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5.1 Explanation and Mechanism -- 5.2 The Explanatory Value of Functions -- 5.3 Decomposing Referential Competence -- 5.3.1 The Contextual Aspect -- 5.3.2 External Conditions -- 5.3.3 The Constitutive Aspect -- 5.3.4 Etiology or Constitution -- 5.4 Conclusion -- 6: Referential Competence -- 6.1 Speaker Meaning -- 6.2 Speaker Reference -- 6.2.1 Direct Evidence and Inference Base Features -- 6.2.2 Audience-directed Reference -- 6.3 Conclusion -- 7: Edenic Intentionalism -- 7.1 Objections to Intentionalism -- 7.2 The Edenic Constraint on Reference -- 7.3 Confusion Is Corruptive |
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7.3.1 Corruption in Combinatory Confusion -- 7.3.2 Corruption in Separatory Confusion -- 7.4 Normal Proper Names -- 7.5 Conclusion -- 8: Good Cases, Bad Cases -- 8.1 The Belief that Elms Are Beeches -- 8.2 Two Case Studies -- 8.2.1 Kripke on Semantic Reference -- 8.2.2 Reimer against Intentionalism -- 8.3 Donnellan and Kripke on Descriptions -- 8.4 Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index -- Permissions Acknowledgments |
| Summary |
Combining new insights from cognitive science and speech act theory, Unnsteinsson develops a compelling theory of singular reference which avoids well-known puzzles. The theory, Edenic intentionalism, is grounded in a mechanistic perspective on explanation in cognitive science and a new Gricean account of speaker meaning and speaker reference |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Subject |
Intentionalism.
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Intention (Logic)
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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Attitude (Psychology)
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Attitude (Psychology)
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Intention (Logic)
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Intentionalism.
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Intentionality (Philosophy)
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
0192688642 |
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9780192688644 |
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