| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 558 pages) : illustrations (chiefly color) |
| Series |
Lecture notes in computer science ; 13112 |
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LNCS sublibrary: SL3 - Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI |
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Lecture notes in computer science ; 13112.
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LNCS sublibrary. SL 3, Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI.
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| Contents |
Mechanism Design and Pricing -- Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality -- Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials -- The Optimality of Upgrade Pricing -- On Symmetries in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design -- Welfare-Preserving $nvarepsilon$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss -- Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances -- Contract Design for A orestation Programs -- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posted pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching -- Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness -- On the benefits of being constrained when receiving signals -- Towards a Characterization of Worst Case Equilibria in the Discriminatory Price Auction -- Matching, Markets and Equilibria -- Improved Analysis of RANKING for Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in the Random Order Model -- Beyond Pigouvian Taxes: A Worst Case Analysis -- The core of housing markets from an agent's perspective: Is it worth sprucing up your home -- Mechanisms for Trading Durable Goods -- Formal Barriers to Simple Algorithms for the Matroid Secretary Problem -- Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy -- The Platform Design Problem -- A Consumer-Theoretic Characterization of Fisher Market Equilibria -- Learning, Fairness, Privacy and Behavioral Models A tight negative example for MMS fair allocations -- Approximating Nash Social Welfare Under Binary XOS and Binary Subadditive Valuations -- Default Ambiguity: Finding the Best Solution to the Clearing Problem -- Planning on an Empty Stomach: On Agents with Projection Bias -- Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment -- Social Choice and Cryptocurrencies -- Decentralized Asset Custody Scheme with Security against Rational Adversary -- The Distortion of Distributed Metric Social Choice -- Maximal Information Propagation via Lotteries -- Envy-free division of multi-layered cakes -- Computing envy-freeable allocations with limited subsidies |
| Summary |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 17th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2021, which was held online during December 14-17, 2021. The conference was originally planned to take place in Potsdam, Germany, but changed to a virtual event due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The 41 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 146 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: mechanism design and pricing; matching, markets and equilibria; learning, fairness, privacy and behavioral models; social choice and cryptocurrencies |
| Notes |
International conference proceedings |
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Includes author index |
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Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed January 28, 2022) |
| Subject |
Internet -- Economic aspects -- Congresses
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Computer networks -- Economic aspects -- Congresses
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Electronic commerce -- Congresses
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Game theory -- Congresses
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Computer networks -- Economic aspects
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Electronic commerce
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Game theory
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Internet -- Economic aspects
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| Genre/Form |
Electronic books
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proceedings (reports)
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Conference papers and proceedings
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Conference papers and proceedings.
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Actes de congrès.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Feldman, Michal, editor
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Fu, Hu, editor
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Talgam-Cohen, Inbal, editor
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| ISBN |
9783030946760 |
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3030946762 |
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