| Description |
1 online resource : illustrations (some color) |
| Series |
Lecture notes in computer science ; 12885 |
|
LNCS sublibrary: SL3 - Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web and HCI |
|
Lecture notes in computer science ; 12885.
|
|
LNCS sublibrary. SL 3, Information systems and applications, incl. Internet/Web, and HCI.
|
| Contents |
Auctions and Mechanism Design -- Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming -- The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions -- Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation -- Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location -- Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values -- Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection -- Computational Aspects of Games -- On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium -- Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents -- Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games- Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity and parameterized algorithms -- Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts -- Algorithmic Challenges in Information Design XVII -- On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games -- Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures -- Markets and Matchings -- On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching -- Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets -- Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget -- Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets -- The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences -- Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality? -- Social Choice and Cooperative Games -- Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information -- Hedonic Expertise Games -- When Dividing Mixed Manna is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores -- Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values -- An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy -- Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers -- Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees -- Abstracts -- On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining Pools -- On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap -- Vote Delegation and Misbehavio |
| Summary |
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 14th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2021, held in Aarhus, Denmark in September 2021.* The 26 full papers presented together with 4 abstract papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 73 submissions. In addition, the volume contains abstracts from 3 invited talks and 2 tutorial talks. The papers are organized in topical sections named: auctions and mechanism design, computational aspects of games, markets and matchings, and social choice and cooperative games. * The conference was held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic |
| Notes |
International conference proceedings |
|
Includes author index |
|
Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed September 21, 2021) |
| Subject |
Game theory -- Congresses
|
|
Algorithms -- Congresses
|
|
Algorithms
|
|
Game theory
|
| Genre/Form |
proceedings (reports)
|
|
Conference papers and proceedings
|
|
Conference papers and proceedings.
|
|
Actes de congrès.
|
| Form |
Electronic book
|
| Author |
Caragiannis, Ioannis, editor
|
|
Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt, editor
|
| ISBN |
9783030859473 |
|
3030859479 |
|
