| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction I: Moral Conflicts and Deontology -- 1.1. Moral Conflicts -- 1.1.1. The disambiguation of some key concepts -- 1.1.1.1. Two senses of ̀prima facie' -- 1.1.1.2. Weak permissibility versus strong permissibility -- 1.1.1.2.1. Two types of obligations and two types of permissibility -- 1.1.1.2.2. Infringements versus violations -- 1.1.1.3. Strong justification versus weak justification -- 1.1.1.4. Two senses of ̀rightness' -- 1.1.1.5. Two senses of ̀absolute' -- 1.1.1.6. Overtopping versus overriding -- 1.1.2. Chariness of moral conflicts -- 1.1.2.1. Consequentialist balancing -- 1.1.2.2. The objectivity of morality -- 1.1.2.3. Logical incoherence -- 1.1.2.4. Moral conflicts and action-guidance -- 1.1.2.5. Concerns about fairness or excessive onerousness -- 1.2. The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and the General Structure of Morality -- 1.2.1. The division between deontology and consequentialism -- 1.2.1.1. Intrinsic moral statuses |
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Note continued: 1.2.1.2. Agent-neutrality versus agent-centredness -- 1.2.1.3. Absolute prohibitions -- 1.2.2. The general structure of morality -- 1.2.2.1. Moore's tripartite account -- 1.2.2.2. An alternative account of morality -- 1.2.2.3.A pithy conclusion: some differences between the accounts of morality -- 2. Introduction II: What is Torture? -- 2.1. Definitional Ventures -- 2.1.1. Convention against Torture -- 2.1.1.1.A few queries -- 2.1.1.2. Some commendations -- 2.1.2. The American definition -- 2.1.3. Amnesty International's definition -- 2.1.4. Philosophers' definitions -- 2.1.4.1. Michael Davis on the ordeal of torture -- 2.1.4.1.1.A first query: the helplessness of victims -- 2.1.4.1.2.A second query: testing the victim's capacity to endure suffering -- 2.1.4.1.3.A third query: psychological torture revisited -- 2.1.4.1.4.A fourth query: against the victim's will -- 2.1.4.1.5.A final query: indifference to the victim's welfare -- 2.1.4.2. Kershnar's formulation |
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Note continued: 2.1.4.3. Miller and the complexities of torture -- 2.1.4.3.1. The third clause -- 2.1.4.3.2. The second clause -- 2.1.4.4. Sussman and the difficulties of defining torture -- 2.1.4.4.1.A preliminary point: a problematic addition -- 2.1.4.4.2.A matter of consent -- 2.1.5. Some of the lessons of this survey of definitions -- 2.2. Varieties of Torture -- 2.2.1. Interrogational torture -- 2.2.1.1. Prospective versus retrospective -- 2.2.1.2. Some varieties of prospective interrogational torture -- 2.2.1.3. Extreme emergencies -- 2.2.2. Placatory torture -- 2.2.2.1.A matter of intentions -- 2.2.2.2.A certain commitment -- 2.2.2.2.1.A first difference -- 2.2.2.2.2.A second difference -- 2.2.2.2.3.A third difference -- 2.2.2.2.4.A matter of importance -- 2.2.3. Intimidatory torture -- 2.2.4. Extortionate torture -- 2.2.5. Act-impelling torture -- 2.2.6. Punitive torture -- 2.2.7. Sadistic torture -- 2.2.8. Discriminatory torture -- 2.2.9. Humiliative torture |
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Note continued: 2.2.10. Extravagantly reckless torture -- 2.2.11. Incapacitative torture -- 2.2.11.1. Lastingly incapacitative torture -- 2.2.11.2. Ephemerally incapacitative torture -- 2.2.11.2.1. The act/omission dichotomy -- 2.2.11.2.2. Fending off the most common objection to Bennett's analysis -- 2.2.11.2.3. Sussman's example of the obese man -- 2.2.11.2.4. Steinhoff's example of the rapist -- 2.2.11.2.5. Steinhoff's example of the snake bite -- 2.2.11.2.6. Kamm on torturing from a distance -- 2.2.11.2.7. From Kamm to Kantians -- 2.2.11.2.8. Hill and the act/omission distinction -- 2.2.11.2.9. Hill and the act/omission distinction redux -- 2.2.12. Edifying torture -- 2.2.12.1. Salvation-oriented torture -- 2.2.12.2. Therapeutic torture -- 2.2.12.2.1. Experimentational torture -- 2.2.12.2.2. Aversion therapy -- 2.2.12.2.3. Averting a coma -- 2.2.12.2.4.A worry about the conflation of distinct issues -- 2.2.12.3. Resistance training -- 2.2.13.A table of the main kinds of torture |
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Note continued: 2.3. Conclusion: An Overview -- 2.3.1. The infliction of severe pain -- 2.3.1.1. Torture versus attempted torture -- 2.3.1.1.1.A different question -- 2.3.1.1.2.A question put aside -- 2.3.1.1.3.A matter of gravity -- 2.3.1.1.4. Back to the definition -- 2.3.1.2. How long? -- 2.3.2. Against the interests of the victim? -- 2.3.3. Consent and control -- 2.3.3.1. Two caveats about control -- 2.3.3.2. The upshot of the matter -- 2.3.4.A definition of torture -- 3. Why Torture is Wrong -- 3.1. Some Previous Accounts of the Wrongness of Torture -- 3.1.1. Contractarian approaches -- 3.1.1.1. Nagel and justifiability -- 3.1.1.2. Meisels and the social-contract tradition -- 3.1.1.2.1.A terse critique -- 3.1.1.2.2.A possible reply -- 3.1.1.2.3. Another possible reply -- 3.1.2. Shue on the defencelessness of victims -- 3.1.2.1. Putting aside an issue -- 3.1.2.2. On defencelessness as the wrong-making property of torture -- 3.1.2.3.A loss of one's ideals? -- 3.1.2.3.1.A query |
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Note continued: 3.1.2.3.2. Another query -- 3.1.3. Shue and others on the spread of torture -- 3.1.3.1.A weak argument -- 3.1.3.2. Another weak argument -- 3.1.3.2.1.A first reply -- 3.1.3.2.2.A second reply -- 3.1.3.3. Empirical speculations and slippery slopes -- 3.1.3.3.1. Two clarifications -- 3.1.3.3.2. An additional clarification -- 3.1.3.3.3.A first example -- 3.1.3.3.4.A second example -- 3.1.3.3.5.A first objection -- 3.1.3.3.6.A second objection: preliminary clarifications -- 3.1.3.3.7.A second objection continued: the meagreness of the evidence -- 3.1.3.3.8.A closing caveat -- 3.1.4. From consequentialism to Kantianism: torture and agency -- 3.1.4.1. Waldron on torture and dignity -- 3.1.4.2. Sussman on the limits of Kantianism -- 3.1.5. Sussman on torture and self-betrayal -- 3.1.5.1. Techniques of torturous self-betrayal -- 3.1.5.2. The source of the self-betrayal -- 3.1.5.3. Some transitional ruminations on Sussman's theory -- 3.2. Why Torture is Wrong |
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Note continued: 3.2.1. The consumingness of severe pain -- 3.2.1.1. The consumingness of euphoria -- 3.2.1.2. Some observations by philosophers and other theorists -- 3.2.1.2.1. Beccaria on the filling of the sensory field -- 3.2.1.2.2. Luban on the tyranny of severe pain -- 3.2.1.2.3. Kreimer on the occupation of the self -- 3.2.1.2.4. Scarry on the body in severe pain -- 3.2.1.3. The perils of overstatement -- 3.2.1.3.1. Preliminary remarks -- 3.2.1.3.2. Hyperbole best avoided -- 3.2.2.Combining two insights -- 3.2.2.1. The two main strands -- 3.2.2.2. The combination -- 3.2.2.2.1. Not enough in isolation -- 3.2.2.2.2. Morally vitiating purposes -- 3.2.2.2.3. The Minimal Invasion Principle -- 3.2.2.2.4. Consequentialist calculations -- 3.2.2.2.5. Agony and oppression: the factors of consent and control afresh -- 3.2.2.2.6. Some implications: edifying torture and sado-masochism -- 3.2.2.2.7. Some implications: the problem of animals |
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Note continued: 3.2.2.2.8. Agony and oppression redux: a recapitulation and a transition -- 3.2.3.A perpetrator-focused perspective -- 3.2.3.1. Monstrous victims of torture -- 3.2.3.2. Being killed versus being tortured -- 3.2.3.3. An additional perspective -- 3.2.3.3.1.A perpetrator-focused justificatory basis -- 3.2.3.3.2.A first query: why is ephemerally incapacitative torture ever permissible? -- 3.2.3.3.3. Four caveats concerning my response to the first query -- 3.2.3.3.4.A second query: why is deliberate killing ever morally permissible? -- 3.2.3.3.5. Clarifying the issue -- 3.2.3.3.6.A third query: why is highly restrictive confinement ever morally permissible? -- 3.2.3.3.7.A fourth query: why is punitive torture absolutely wrong? -- 3.2.3.3.8. Retributivism and the perpetrator-focused perspective -- 3.2.3.3.9.A fifth query: why is consensual placatory torture impermissible? -- 3.2.3.3.10.A final query: why is sado-masochistic torture morally wrong? |
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Note continued: 3.3. Moral Optimality without Moral Permissibility -- 3.3.1.A first example -- 3.3.2.A second example -- 3.3.3. Some general considerations -- 3.3.3.1. Harshness and protractedness -- 3.3.3.2. The exigencies of an emergency -- 3.3.3.3. Threateningness and responsibility -- 3.3.3.4. Probable efficacy -- 3.3.3.5. Legal sanctions -- 4. The Rationality of Deontological Constraints -- 4.1. Placatory Torture and the Unremittingness of Deontological Duties -- 4.1.1.A thought-experiment: sparing someone from a greater wrong -- 4.1.2. The significance of the thought-experiment -- 4.1.3. The moral upshot -- 4.1.3.1. The factor of consent -- 4.1.3.2. The orientation of the torture -- 4.1.3.3. Perpetrator-focused reflections -- 4.1.3.4. Moral optimality -- 4.2. Are Deontological Constraints Irrational? -- 4.2.1. Rationality and maximization -- 4.2.2. Deontological commitments -- 4.2.3. Slippage from none-versus-any to fewer-versus-more -- 4.2.3.1.A first example of the conflation |
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Note continued: 4.2.3.2.A second example -- 4.2.3.3. Goals for deontologists: a first example -- 4.2.3.4. Goals for deontologists: a second example -- 4.2.4. The maximizing conception of rationality redux -- 4.2.5.A return to moral optimality -- 5. Legal Responses to Torture -- 5.1. Legal Approval Ex Ante? -- 5.1.1. Dershowitz and torture warrants -- 5.1.1.1.A first objection to Dershowitz: inapposite comparisons -- 5.1.1.2.A second objection to Dershowitz: a missing prohibition -- 5.1.1.3.A third objection to Dershowitz: inordinate narrowing of the options -- 5.1.1.3.1.A shortcoming in Dershowitz's reply -- 5.1.1.3.2.A possible response by Dershowitz -- 5.1.1.3.3.A second possible response by Dershowitz -- 5.1.1.3.4. Peculiarly worrisome problems -- 5.1.1.3.5.A first rejoinder to Dershowitz: torture without warrants -- 5.1.1.3.6.A second rejoinder to Dershowitz: arguments in tension -- 5.1.1.3.7. The second rejoinder to Dershowitz continued |
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Note continued: 5.1.1.3.8. The second rejoinder to Dershowitz completed -- 5.1.1.3.9.A third rejoinder to Dershowitz: ways of dealing with the problems -- 5.1.1.3.10.A third rejoinder to Dershowitz continued -- 5.1.1.3.11.A third rejoinder to Dershowitz completed -- 5.1.1.4.A fourth objection to Dershowitz: seeking support from a strange quarter -- 5.1.1.5.A final objection to Dershowitz: a matter of moral principle -- 5.1.2. Posner and Vermeule on the regulation of torture -- 5.1.2.1. Posner and Vermeule on deontological absolutism -- 5.1.2.1.1. Missed distinctions and an inapposite focus -- 5.1.2.1.2.A charge of fanaticism and an easy target -- 5.1.2.1.3. Tragic choices as moral conflicts -- 5.1.2.2. Posner and Vermeule on the Legal Prohibition Thesis -- 5.1.2.2.1. Empirical conjectures -- 5.1.2.2.2. Exoneration is tantamount to approval -- 5.1.2.2.3. Not many operational differences -- 5.1.2.2.4. An objection of moral principle |
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Note continued: 5.1.2.2.5. Further remarks on the symbolism of authorizations of interrogational torture -- 5.1.2.3. The analogy between torture and killing -- 5.1.3. Legitimate techniques of interrogation -- 5.1.3.1. Waldron's distrustful arguments -- 5.1.3.2.A partial rejoinder to Waldron -- 5.2. Legal Accountability Ex Post -- 5.2.1. Which defences? -- 5.2.1.1. Mitigations rather than justifications or excuses -- 5.2.1.2. Two preliminary caveats -- 5.2.1.3. Necessity or protection-of-oneself-or-others? -- 5.2.1.4.A residual role for the defence of duress -- 5.2.2. Which sanctions? -- 5.2.2.1. Criminal sanctions imposed on individual officials -- 5.2.2.2. Civil sanctions applied to individual officials -- 5.2.2.3. Institutional sanctions against individual officials -- 5.2.2.4. Collectively borne sanctions -- 5.2.3. Private individuals as defendants -- 5.2.3.1. Collective responsibility -- 5.2.3.2. Some public/private similarities relating to individually borne sanctions |
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Note continued: 5.2.3.3. Some public/private differences relating to individually borne sanctions -- 5.2.3.3.1. An example already encountered -- 5.2.3.3.2.A second example -- 5.2.3.3.3. Sado-masochistic torture once more -- 5.2.3.3.4.A rejoinder? -- 5.2.3.3.5. Sado-masochistic torture and the harm principle -- 5.3. The Complexities of Involvement -- 5.3.1. Extradition, deportation, and extraordinary rendition -- 5.3.2. Evidence produced by interrogational torture -- 5.3.3. Article 3 and Article 15 conjoined -- 5.4. Conclusion |
| Summary |
The morality of interrogational torture has been the subject of heated debate in recent years. In explaining why torture is morally wrong, Matthew Kramer engages in deep philosophical reflections on the nature of morality and on moral conflicts |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Online resource; title from home page (viewed on May 20, 2014) |
| Subject |
Torture -- Moral and ethical aspects
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Torture -- Moral and ethical aspects
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Social Welfare & Social Work.
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Social Sciences.
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Criminology, Penology & Juvenile Delinquency.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191782664 |
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0191782661 |
