| Description |
1 online resource (390 p.) |
| Contents |
Cover -- Competitive Agents in Certain and Uncertain Markets -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1: What's Covered -- Chapter 2: Differentials and Convex Analysis -- 1 Correspondences -- 2 Differentiability? -- 3 Do You Prefer to Be Constrained or Penalized? -- 4 Convex Structures -- 4.1 Concave (Convex) Functions. -- 4.2 Differential Properties of Concave Functions and Directional Derivatives. -- 5 Conjugate Duality -- 5.1 A Brief Word about Dual Spaces -- 5.2 Concave Conjugates -- 5.2.1 Intuition and Sketch of a Demonstration |
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5.3 A More Formal Argument -- 5.4 And for Nonconcave Structures? -- 5.5 Two Economically Important Concave-Conjugate Pairs -- 5.6 Convex Conjugates -- 5.7 Fenchel's Duality Theorem -- 6 Chapter Commentary -- Chapter 3: Orders and Their Representations -- 1 What Is an Order? -- 2 Some Structure (Assumptions) -- 3 Cardinal Representations of Orders -- 4 Properties of d (x, y -- g) -- 5 Superdifferentiability and d ( x, y -- g) -- 5.1 A Basic Result on Internal (Shadow) Prices -- 6 Turning the Bowl Over -- 7 Three Types of Convexity Restrictions -- 8 Why Three Types of Convexity? |
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9 Chapter Commentary -- Chapter 4: Squiggly Economics -- 1 A Standard Problem: Expenditure Minimization -- 2 Expenditure Minimization without Lagrangians -- 2.1 McKenzie Expenditure from an Indicator Function -- 2.2 McKenzie Expenditure Function from a Distance Function -- 2.3 d and E as Concave Conjugates -- 2.4 Why Is Conjugacy (Duality) Important? -- 2.5 E (q -- y)′s Behavior in y -- 3 A Standard Problem: Revenue Maximization -- 4 A Standard Problem: Profit Maximization -- 5 Superdifferentials, Subdifferentials, and Economic Behavior -- 6 Chapter Commentary -- Chapter 5: The Consumer Problem |
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1 The Budget Correspondence -- 2 Rational Demand -- 3 Price-Dependent Rational Demand -- 4 What's Rational? -- 5 A Utility Function? -- 6 Marshallian Demand and the Slutsky-Hicks Equation -- 7 Profit Maximization and Utility Maximization -- 8 Revealed Preference -- 9 Constructing a Utility Function from E(p -- y) or R(p -- x) -- 10 A Structural Restriction -- 11 Chapter Commentary -- Chapter 6: The (Nonstochastic) Producer Problem -- 1 The Canonical Problem -- 2 Defining the Technology -- 2.1 Properties of Output Sets -- 2.1.1 No Fixed Costs and No Free Lunch (No Land of Cockaigne) |
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2.1.2 Disposability of Outputs -- 2.1.3 Input Disposability and Input Congestion -- 2.1.4 Bounds on Output Sets -- 2.1.5 Curvature Properties of Output Sets -- 2.1.6 Y ∶ ℝN ⇉ ℝM a closed correspondence -- 3 Function Representations of the Technology -- 3.1 The directional input distance function -- 3.2 Properties of d (x, y -- g) -- 4 Structure of Technology -- 4.1 Homotheticity -- 4.1.1 Output homotheticity -- 4.1.2 Quasi-input homotheticity -- 4.1.3 Quasi-output homotheticity -- 4.2 Nonjointness -- 4.2.1 Input nonjointness -- 4.2.2 Output nonjoint -- 4.2.3 Input-price-nonjoint |
| Summary |
Competitive Agents in Certain and Uncertain Markets uses concepts from optimization theory to develop an integrated analytic framework for treating consumer, producer, and market equilibrium analysis as special cases of a generic optimization problem. Building on basic economic concepts, Robert G. Chambers shows how virtually identical conjugate analyses form the basis for modeling economic behavior across both certain and uncertain circumstances |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780190063023 |
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0190063025 |
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