| Description |
1 online resource (561 p.) |
| Series |
Philosophy of Mind Ser |
|
Philosophy of Mind Ser
|
| Contents |
Cover -- Half-Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Consciousness -- Pure perception -- What is a joint? -- Constitutivity vs. explanatory depth -- The contents of perception -- Realism about perceptual and cognitive representation -- Three-layer methodology -- Higher "capacity" in perception (whether conscious or not) than cognition -- Armchair approaches to the perception/cognition border -- Conceptual engineering -- If there is a fundamental difference between perception and cognition, why don't we see the border in the brain? |
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Interface of perception with cognition -- Why should philosophers be interested in this book? -- Roadmap -- 2. Markers of the perceptual and the cognitive -- Adaptation -- Perception vs. cognition in language -- Different kinds of adaptation -- Visual hierarchy -- The use of adaptation in distinguishing low-level from high-level perception -- The use of adaptation in distinguishing perception from cognition -- Semantic satiation -- Rivalry -- Pop-out -- Interpolation of illusory contours -- Neural markers of perception and cognition -- Other markers of perception -- Phenomenology -- Summary |
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3. Two kinds of seeing-as and singular content -- Burge and Schellenberg on singular content -- Attribution and discrimination -- Ordinary vs. technical language -- Bias: Perception vs. perceptual judgment -- Evaluative perception -- 4. Perception is constitutively nonpropositional and nonconceptual -- Concepts and propositions -- Format/content/state/function -- The nonpropositional nature of perception -- Conjunction -- Negation -- Disjunction -- Atomic propositional representations -- Rivalry and propositional perception |
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How do iconicity, nonconceptuality, and nonpropositionality fit together? -- Laws of appearance -- Bayesian "inference" -- Bayesian realism -- 5. Perception is iconic -- cognition is discursive -- Iconicity, format, and function -- Iconicity and determinacy -- Structure -- Analog tracking and mirroring -- Analog magnitude representations -- Mental imagery -- Holism -- Integral vs. separable -- Iconic object-representations in perception -- Object files in working memory -- Memory involving perceptual representations -- 6. Nonconceptual color perception -- Perceptual category representations |
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Infant color categories -- Infants' failure to normally deploy color concepts -- Color constancy -- Working memory again -- Experiments on babies' working memory representations -- Adult nonconceptual color perception -- Is high-level perception conceptual? -- Systematicity again -- Modality -- 7. Neural evidence that perception is nonconceptual -- "No-report" paradigm vs. "no-cognition" paradigm -- Another "no-report" paradigm -- 8. Evidence that is wrongly taken to show that perception is conceptual -- Fast perception -- Cognitive access to mid-level vision |
| Summary |
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking explores questions about the relationship of perception and cognition, not by appealing to ""intuitions,"" as is common in philosophy, but to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
|
9. Cognitive penetration is common but does not challenge the joint |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780197622247 |
|
0197622240 |
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