| Description |
1 online resource (625 p.) |
| Contents |
Cover -- IBFD Doctoral Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Table of Contents -- Abbreviations -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1.1. Motivation and relevance -- 1.2. Research question -- 1.3. Method, delimitations and documents used -- 1.4. Outline -- Chapter 2 The Preparatory Works and the Drafting of the Code -- 2.1. Introduction -- 2.2. The Ruding Report on the need to tackle harmful tax competition -- 2.3. The First Monti Memorandum and the need for a global approach to tax issues -- 2.4. The Second Monti Memorandum and the need to develop a code to tackle harmful tax competition -- 2.5. The drafting of the first compromise proposal for the Code -- 2.6. "Agreement in principle" on the Council's first compromise proposal for the Code -- 2.7. The Third Monti Memorandum and the drafting of the second and third compromise proposals for the Code -- 2.8. Discussion on the third compromise proposal for the Code by the Council -- 2.9. The Fourth Monti Memorandum and the drafting of the fourth compromise proposal for the Code -- 2.10. Paving the way for political agreement on the Code -- 2.11. Political agreement on the Code by the Council -- 2.12. Summary and conclusions -- Chapter 3 The Legal Status of the Code -- 3.1. Introduction -- 3.2. Soft law: An informal para and pre-law steering instrument -- 3.3. Soft law: Soft governance to tackle harmful tax competition -- 3.4. The Open Method of Coordination -- 3.5. The Code of Conduct for Business Taxation as an OMC in disguise? -- 3.5.1. OMC features in the area of pseudo-case law -- 3.5.2. OMC features in the area of pseudo-legislation -- 3.6. Summary and conclusions -- Chapter 4 The Governance and Working Methods of the Code of Conduct Group -- 4.1. Introduction: The parties involved in the Code of Conduct Group's decision-making process -- 4.2. The Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) itself |
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4.2.1. A preparatory Council working group -- 4.2.2. The mandate of the Code of Conduct Group -- 4.2.3. The governance of the Code of Conduct Group -- 4.2.3.1. Introduction -- 4.2.3.2. Governance and Member State representation -- 4.2.3.3. Decision-making -- 4.2.3.4. Confidentiality -- 4.2.4. The working methods of the Code of Conduct Group -- 4.2.4.1. Introduction -- 4.2.4.2. Pseudo-case law practice -- 4.2.4.2.1. Phase 1: Standstill notification phase -- 4.2.4.2.2. Phase 2: Agreed description phase -- 4.2.4.2.3. Phase 3: Formal assessment phase -- 4.2.4.2.4. Phase 4: Rollback notification and monitoring phase -- 4.2.4.3. Pseudo-legislation practice -- 4.2.4.3.1. Phase 1: Drafting phase -- 4.2.4.3.2. Phase 2: Adoption and publication phase -- 4.2.4.3.3. Phase 3: Implementation phase -- 4.2.4.3.4. Phase 4: Monitoring phase -- 4.3. The role of Code of Conduct SubGroups -- 4.4. The role of other high-level working groups -- 4.5. The role of the European Commission -- 4.6. The role of the European Parliament -- 4.7. The role of the Council Secretariat -- 4.8. The role of Coreper -- 4.9. The role of the Ecofin Council -- 4.10. Summary and conclusions -- Chapter 5 The Geographical Scope of the Code -- 5.1. Introduction -- 5.2. Member States -- 5.3. Outermost Regions -- 5.4. European territories for whose external relations a Member State is responsible -- 5.5. Overseas Countries and Territories -- 5.6. Special cases: Small islands -- 5.7. Third countries -- 5.8. Summary and conclusions -- Chapter 6 The Substantive Scope of the Code -- 6.1. Introduction -- 6.2. A four-step assessment of the harmfulness of preferential tax regimes -- 6.3. Step 1: Is the tax regime within scope? -- 6.3.1. Introduction: Taxes covered -- 6.3.2. "Business taxation" -- 6.3.2.1. Introduction -- 6.3.2.2. Indirect taxation -- 6.3.2.3. Individual income taxation |
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6.3.2.4. Excluded business sectors: Shipping and financial services -- 6.3.3. "Measures" -- 6.3.4. "Affect or may affect in a significant way" -- 6.3.5. "Business activity" -- 6.3.6. "In the Community" -- 6.4. Step 2: Is the tax regime potentially harmful? -- 6.4.1. Introduction: The gateway criterion -- 6.4.2. "A significantly lower level of taxation", "the effective level of taxation", "zero taxation" and "the normal level of taxation" -- 6.4.3. Application -- 6.4.4. Revision -- 6.5. Step 3: Is the tax regime actually harmful? -- 6.5.1. Introduction: The assessment criteria -- 6.5.2. Ring-fencing I -- 6.5.2.1. Definition -- 6.5.2.2. Application -- 6.5.2.2.1. De jure assessment -- 6.5.2.2.2. De facto assessment -- 6.5.3. Ring-fencing II -- 6.5.3.1. Definition -- 6.5.3.2. Application -- 6.5.4. Substance criterion -- 6.5.4.1. Definition -- 6.5.4.2. Application -- 6.5.5. Profit determination criterion -- 6.5.5.1. Definition -- 6.5.5.2. Application -- 6.5.6. Transparency criterion -- 6.5.6.1. Definition -- 6.5.6.2. Application -- 6.6. Step 4: Is the harmful tax regime nevertheless justified? -- 6.6.1. Introduction: Justifications -- 6.6.2. Absence of harmful effects on other Member States' economies -- 6.6.3. Supporting the economic development of underdeveloped regions -- 6.6.4. Ensuring the competitiveness of SMEs and of certain sectors -- 6.6.5. Precedent -- 6.7. Summary and conclusions -- Chapter 7 Discussion and Assessment of the Pseudo-Case Law of the Code of Conduct Group -- 7.1. Introduction -- 7.2. Generic corporate tax regimes -- 7.2.1. Overview -- 7.2.2. The Gibraltar Tax exemption regime for passive income -- 7.2.3. The Gibraltar Tax treatment of asset-holding companies -- 7.2.4. The Isle of Man Retail tax regime -- 7.3. Shareholder tax regimes -- 7.3.1. Overview -- 7.3.2. The Aruban Imputation payment company regime |
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7.3.3. The Maltese Advance company income tax and refunds regime -- 7.3.4. The Isle of Man Distributable profits charge regime -- 7.3.5. The Jersey Deemed distribution and attribution regime -- 7.4. Interest regimes -- 7.4.1. Overview -- 7.4.2. Interest deduction regimes -- 7.4.2.1. Actual deduction regimes -- 7.4.2.2. Deemed deduction regimes -- 7.4.3. Tax rate regimes -- 7.4.3.1. Reduced tax rate regimes -- 7.4.4. Tax base regimes -- 7.4.4.1. Tax exemption regimes -- 7.4.4.2. Tax-free reserve regimes -- 7.4.4.3. Reduced tax base regimes -- 7.4.4.3.1. Introduction -- 7.4.4.3.2. The Hungarian Interest from affiliated companies regime -- 7.4.4.3.3. The Dutch Group interest box regime -- 7.4.4.3.4. The Hungarian Tax base for interest payments received from abroad regime -- 7.5. Notional interest deduction regimes -- 7.6. Intellectual property regimes -- 7.6.1. Overview -- 7.6.2. Front-end (cost-based) regimes -- 7.6.3. Back-end (income-based) regimes -- 7.7. Insurance company regimes -- 7.8. Generic holding company regimes (participation exemptions) -- 7.9. Group coordination regimes -- 7.10. Special holding company regimes -- 7.11. Intermediate group finance and licence company regimes -- 7.12. Foreign finance branch regimes -- 7.13. Informal capital regimes -- 7.14. Hybrid financing regimes -- 7.15. Free zone regimes -- 7.16. Summary and conclusions -- 7.16.1. Content of the pseudo-case law of the Group -- 7.16.2. Effectiveness of the pseudo-case law of the Group -- 7.16.3. The Code is backed by the State aid prohibition and vice versa -- Chapter 8 Discussion and Assessment of the Pseudo-Legislation of the Code of Conduct Group -- 8.1. Introduction -- 8.2. Exchange of information on tax rulings -- 8.3. Common tax ruling policy -- 8.4. EU-inbound profit transfers (the "gatekeeper problem") |
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8.5. EU-outbound payments (the "reverse gatekeeper problem") -- 8.6. Hybrid mismatches -- 8.6.1. Introduction -- 8.6.2. Hybrid financing mismatches -- 8.6.3. Hybrid entities and hybrid PE mismatches -- 8.7. Transfer pricing -- 8.8. Summary and conclusions -- Chapter 9 The Market Distortion Provisions and Harmful Tax Competition -- 9.1. Introduction: The market distortion rules as an alternative or complement to the Code -- 9.2. The notion of a market distortion in articles 116 and 117 of the TFEU -- 9.2.1. Introduction -- 9.2.2. "A difference" (disparity) -- 9.2.3. "Distorting the conditions of competition" -- 9.2.4. "Resultant distortion needs to be eliminated" -- 9.2.5. Market-distorting fiscal disparities -- 9.3. Market distortion procedure and enforcement -- 9.3.1. Introduction -- 9.3.2. Monitoring of existing distortions (rollback) -- 9.3.3. Notification of new distortions (standstill) -- 9.3.4. No direct effect -- 9.4. Practical effect of the market distortion rules in tax and non-tax cases -- 9.4.1. Introduction -- 9.4.2. The European Commission -- 9.4.3. The European Parliament -- 9.4.4. The judiciary -- 9.5. Reasons for non-application of the market distortion rules in direct tax matters -- 9.5.1. Introduction -- 9.5.2. Legal issues -- 9.5.2.1. Introduction: preference for and primacy of other market integrating legal mechanisms to tackle market distortions -- 9.5.2.2. Harmful tax competition: the Code of Conduct for Business Taxation -- 9.5.2.3. Harmonization of national laws necessary for the functioning of the internal market -- 9.5.2.4. Free movement rights -- 9.5.2.5. State aid prohibition -- 9.5.2.6. Conclusions -- 9.5.3. Procedural and organizational issues -- 9.5.4. Conceptual issues -- 9.5.5. Political unfeasibility -- 9.6. Summary and conclusions |
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Chapter 10 Summary, Conclusions and Outlook: Inside the EU Code of Conduct Group -- 20 Years of Tackling Harmful Tax Competition |
| Summary |
This book analyses the functioning and effectiveness of the diplomatic EU Code of Conduct Group in tackling harmful tax competition in the European Union |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
| Subject |
Business enterprises -- Taxation -- European Union countries
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Business enterprises -- Taxation
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European Union countries
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9789087227074 |
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9087227078 |
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