| Description |
1 online resource |
| Contents |
Cover -- Biological Essentialism -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Resurrecting Biological Essentialism -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Evidence of the Consensus -- 1.3 An Argument for Intrinsic Biological Essentialism -- 1.4 Relational Species Concepts -- 1.5 A Crucial Distinction -- 1.6 Species Concepts and the Category Problem (2) -- 1.7 BSC, ENC, and the Taxon Problem (1) -- 1.8 The Conspecificity Route to Error about the Taxon Problem (1) -- 1.9 P-CC and the Taxon Problem (1) -- 1.10 Variation and Change -- Variation -- Gradual Change -- Indeterminacy -- Arbitrariness |
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Worldmaking" -- Monsters -- Essentialism? -- 1.11 Conclusion -- 2. Defending Partly Intrinsic Taxon Essentialism -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Clarifications -- 2.3 Three Important Distinctions -- 2.4 Variation -- 2.4.1 The Common Cause Hypothesis -- 2.4.2 Genetic Variations -- 2.4.3 Phenotypic Variations -- 2.4.4 Causes of Phenotypic Properties -- 2.4.5 Complicated Developmental Pathways -- 2.4.6 Disjunctive Developmental Pathways -- 2.4.7 Evolving not Timeless -- 2.5 "The Added Metaphysical Claim" -- 2.6 The Irrelevance of the Species Concepts -- 2.7 The Conspecificity Diagnosis |
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2.8 The Relational View of Conspecificity (R-CON) -- 2.9 The Essence of Implements ("Artifacts") -- 2.10 Godman and Papineau against Partly Intrinsic Taxon Essentialism -- 2.11 The Historical Species Essentialism of Godman, Mallozzi, and Papineau -- 2.11.1 The "More Fundamental Objection" -- 2.11.2 The Positive View -- 2.12 Conclusion -- 3. Historical Biological Essentialism -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 An Argument for Partly Historical Taxon Essentialism -- 3.3 Hypothesis (1): Descended from Certain Particular Actual Organisms |
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3.4 Hypothesis (2): Descended from a Certain Kind of Organism (Which Itself has a Wholly Relational Essence) -- 3.5 Hypothesis (3): Descended from a Certain Kind of Organism with a Partly Intrinsic Essence -- 3.6 Objections: Twin Earth and the Like -- 3.7 Conclusion -- 4. Individual Essentialism in Biology -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Individual Essentialism: A Kripkean View -- 4.3 An Argument for Partly Intrinsic Individual Essentialism -- 4.4 An Argument for Partly Historical Individual Essentialism -- 4.5 Haecceitism -- 4.6 Essential Membership |
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4.7 Objection 1: The Interbreeding and Ecological Approaches to Species -- 4.8 Objection 2: The Cladistic Approach to Species -- 4.9 Objection 3: Kitcher's "Dumbbell Allopatry" -- 4.10 Objection 4: Higher Taxa -- 4.11 Conclusion -- 5. Type Specimens and Reference -- 5.1 Introduction -- 5.2 The Causal Theory of Reference and Levine's Thesis -- 5.3 The Falsity of Levine's Thesis -- The Case for C1 -- 5.4 "But What about the Theory of Reference?" -- The Case for C2 -- 5.5 The Causal Theory of Multiple Grounding -- The Case for C3 -- 5.6 Philosophical Evaluations of Levine's Thesis -- 5.6.1 Haber |
| Summary |
The consensus in philosophy of biology is that biological essences, such as the essences of species, are wholly relational; Michael Devitt argues that they are at least partly intrinsic. He further argues that an individual is essentially a member of its species. He concludes by considering whether race is biologically 'real' |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on April 13, 2023) |
| Subject |
Biology -- Philosophy.
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Essentialism (Philosophy)
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Essentialism (Philosophy)
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Biology -- Philosophy
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Biology, life sciences.
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Science.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9780191987748 |
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0191987743 |
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9780192576606 |
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0192576607 |
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