| Description |
1 online resource (259 p.) |
| Series |
Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Ser |
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Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy Ser
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| Contents |
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- List of Exercises -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Fundamentals -- 1.1: Propositional logic -- 1.1.1: Grammar -- 1.1.2: Semantics -- 1.1.3: Proofs -- 1.1.4: Proof strategy -- 1.1.5: The relation of semantics and proofs -- 1.2: Predicate logic -- 1.2.1: Grammar -- 1.2.2: Scope -- 1.2.3: Semantics -- 1.2.4: Proofs -- 1.3: Identity -- 1.3.1: Grammar -- 1.3.2: Semantics -- 1.3.3: Proofs -- 1.4: Use and mention -- Chapter 2: Quantifiers -- 2.1: Beyond ∀ and ∃ -- 2.1.1: What is a quantifier? |
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2.1.2: Semantics of binary quantifiers -- 2.1.3: Most: an essentially binary quantifier -- 2.1.4: Unary quantifiers beyond ∀ and ∃ -- 2.1.5: Generalized quantifiers -- 2.2: Definite descriptions -- 2.2.1: Terms or quantifiers? -- 2.2.2: Definite descriptions and scope -- 2.2.3: Russell's theory of descriptions -- 2.2.4: Proofs -- 2.3: Second-order quantifiers -- 2.3.1: Standard semantics for monadic second-order logic -- 2.3.2: Expressive limitations of first-order logic -- 2.3.3: Set theory in sheep's clothing? -- 2.3.4: Boolos's plural interpretation -- 2.3.5: Beyond monadic second-order logic |
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2.4: Substitutional quantifiers -- 2.4.1: Objectual and substitutional quantification -- 2.4.2: Nonexistent objects -- 2.4.3: Quantifying into attitude reports -- 2.4.4: Sentence quantifiers -- 2.4.5: Quantifying into quotes -- 2.4.6: Defining truth -- 2.4.7: Quantifying into quotes and paradox -- 2.4.8: The circularity worry -- Chapter 3: Modal Logic -- 3.1: Modal propositional logic -- 3.1.1: Grammar -- 3.1.2: Semantics -- 3.1.3: Modal logics from K to S5 -- 3.1.4: Proofs -- 3.2: Modal predicate logic -- 3.2.1: Opaque contexts -- 3.2.2: Opaque contexts and quantification |
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3.2.3: The number of planets argument -- 3.2.4: Smullyan's reply -- 3.3: The slingshot argument -- 3.3.1: Applications of slingshot arguments -- 3.3.2: The Gödel slingshot -- 3.3.3: Critique of the slingshot -- 3.4: Kripke's defense of de re modality -- 3.4.1: Kripke's strategy -- 3.4.2: The contingent a priori -- 3.4.3: The necessary a posteriori -- 3.4.4: Epistemic and alethic modals -- Chapter 4: Conditionals -- 4.1: The material conditional -- 4.1.1: Indicative vs. counterfactual -- 4.1.2: Entailments between indicatives and material conditionals |
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4.1.3: Thomson against the "received opinion" -- 4.2: No truth conditions? -- 4.2.1: Arguments for the material conditional analysis -- 4.2.2: Arguments against the material conditional analysis -- 4.2.3: Rejecting Or-to-if -- 4.2.4: Edgington's positive view -- 4.2.5: Against truth conditions -- 4.3: Stalnaker's semantics and pragmatics -- 4.3.1: Propositions, assertion, and the common ground -- 4.3.2: Semantics -- 4.3.3: Reasonable but invalid inferences -- 4.3.4: Contraposition and Hypothetical Syllogism -- 4.3.5: The argument for fatalism -- 4.4: Is Modus Ponens valid? |
| Notes |
Description based upon print version of record |
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4.4.1: The intuitive counterexamples |
| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781351733564 |
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1351733567 |
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