| Description |
1 online resource (xx, 373 pages) : illustrations |
| Series |
Representation and mind |
|
Representation and mind.
|
| Contents |
1 Introduction -- 1.1 Default position -- 1.2 Experience -- 1.3 The character of experience -- 1.4 Understanding-experience -- 1.5 Note about dispositional mental states -- 1.6 Purely experiential content -- 1.7 Account of four seconds of thought -- 2 Three questions -- 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Mental and the nonmental -- 2.3 Mental and the publicly observable -- 2.4 Mental and the behavioral -- 2.5 Neobehaviorism and reductionism -- 2.6 Naturalism in the philosophy of mind -- 2.7 Conclusion: The three questions -- 3 Agnostic materialism, part 1 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Monism -- 3.3 Linguistic argument -- 3.4 Materialism and M & P monism -- 3.5 Comment on reduction -- 3.6 Impossibility of an "objective phenomenology" -- 3.7 Asymmetry and reduction -- 3.8 Equal-status monism -- 3.9 Panpsychism -- 3.10 Inescapability of metaphysics -- 4 Agnostic materialism, part 2 -- 4.1 Ignorance -- 4.2 Sensory spaces -- 4.3 Experience, explanation, and theoretical integration -- 4.4 Hard part of the mind-body problem -- 4.5 Neutral monism and agnostic monism -- 4.6 Comment on eliminativism, instrumentalism, and so on 4.7 Conclusion-- 5 Mentalism, idealism, and immaterialism -- 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Mentalism -- 5.3 Strict or pure process idealism -- 5.4 Active-principle idealism -- 5.5 Stuff idealism -- 5.6 Immaterialism -- 5.7 Positions restated -- 5.8 Dualist options -- 5.9 Summary 5.10 Frege's thesis -- 5.11 Objections to pure process idealism -- 5.12 Problem of mental dispositions -- 6 'Mental' -- 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Shared abilities? -- 6.3 Sorting ability -- 6.4 Definition of 'mental being' -- 6.6 Mental phenomena -- 6.7 View that all mental phenomena are experiential phenomena -- 7 Natural intentionality 7.1 Introduction-- 7.2 E/C intentionality -- 7.3 Experienceless -- 7.4 Intentionality and abstract and nonexistent objects -- 7.5 Experience, purely experiential content, and N/C intentionality -- 7.6 Concepts in nature -- 7.7 Intentionality and experience -- 7.8 Summary with problem 7.9 Conclusion-- 8 Pain and 'pain' 8.1 Introduction-- 8.2 Neobehaviorist view -- 8.3 Linguistic argument for the necessary connection between pain and behavior -- 8.4 Challenge -- 8.5 Sirians -- 8.6 N.N.'s novel -- 8.7 Objection to the Sirians -- 8.8 Betelgeuzians -- 8.9 Point of the Sirians -- 8.10 Functionalism, naturalism, and realism about pain -- 8.11 Unpleasantness and qualitative character -- 9 Weather watchers 9.1 Introduction-- 9.2 Rooting story -- 9.3 What is it like to be a weather watcher? -- 9.4 Aptitudes of mental states -- 9.5 Argument from the conditions for possessing the concept of space -- 9.6 Argument from the conditions for language ability -- 9.7 Argument from the nature of desire -- 9.8 Desire and affect -- 9.9 Argument from the phenomenology of desire -- 10 Behavior 10.1 Introduction -- 10.2 Hopeless definition -- 10.3 Difficulties -- 10.4 Other-observability -- 10.5 Neo-neobehaviorism -- 11 Concept of mind |
| Summary |
"In Mental reality, Galen Strawson argues that much contemporary philosophy of mind gives undue primacy of place to publicly observable phenomena, nonmental phenomena, and behavioral phenomena (understood as publicly observable phenomena) in its account of the nature of mind. It does so at the expense of the phenomena of conscious experience. Strawson describes an alternative position, "naturalized Cartesianism," which couples the materialist view that mind is entirely natural and wholly physical with a fully realist account of the nature of conscious experience. Naturalized Cartesianism is an adductive (as opposed to reductive) form of materialism. Adductive materialists don't claim that conscious experience is anything less than we ordinarily conceive it to be, in being wholly physical. They claim instead that the physical is something more than we ordinarily conceive it to be, given that many of the wholly physical goings on in the brain constitute--literally are--conscious experiences as we ordinarily conceive them. Since naturalized Cartesianism downgrades the place of reference to nonmental and publicly observable phenomena in an adequate account of mental phenomena, Strawson considers in detail the question of what part such reference still has to play. He argues that it is a mistake to think that all behavioral phenomena are publicly observable phenomena. This revised and expanded edition of Mental Reality includes a new appendix, which thoroughly revises the account of intentionality given in chapter 7"--MIT CogNet |
| Analysis |
PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General |
|
COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General |
| Notes |
"A Bradford book." |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages 359-366) and index |
| Notes |
Print version record |
| Subject |
Consciousness.
|
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Behaviorism (Psychology)
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Mind and body.
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Materialism.
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Philosophy of mind.
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PHILOSOPHY -- Mind & Body.
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Behaviorism (Psychology)
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Consciousness.
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Materialism.
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Mind and body.
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Philosophy of mind.
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Filosofie van de geest.
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Bewustzijn.
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Behaviorisme.
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Lichaam en geest.
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Mentale representatie.
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| Form |
Electronic book
|
| LC no. |
2009011301 |
| ISBN |
9780262259224 |
|
0262259222 |
|
9780262260053 |
|
0262260050 |
|
0262513102 |
|
9780262513104 |
|
0262193523 |
|
0262691833 |
|
9780262193528 |
|
9780262691833 |
|
