| Description |
1 online resource (xiv, 304 pages) |
| Contents |
Intro -- COMPETITION FOR PRISONS -- Contents -- List of tables and figures -- Tables -- Figures -- List of acronyms -- Preface -- 1. Origins -- Prologue -- The state of the prisons -- Preparing the ground -- The route to legislation -- 2. Evolution -- 1992-97: establishing a viable market -- 1997-2000: Labour and the PFI boom -- The 2000s: drift and indecision -- 2010-15: Coalition government: the end of competition? -- 3. Related markets: immigration -- two sectors, no competition -- A strange silence -- Development of the immigration detention estate -- A perfect market? -- Comparing sectors -- Conclusion -- 4. Youth custody -- Background -- 1993-97 Conservative government and Secure Training Centres -- 1997 onwards: Labour, expansion of the private sector and creation of the Youth Justice Board -- Managing rising, then falling, demand -- 2010 Coalition government -- Competition? -- Conclusion -- 5. Related markets: electronic monitoring -- fall of the giants -- The fall -- What did the contractors do wrong? -- Why did they behave like this? -- Impact -- The untold half of the story -- Why are these questions not being asked? -- Non-barking watchdogs -- So who is to blame? -- 6. The quasi-market: characteristics and operation -- Quasi-markets in public services -- Scope and size of the quasi-market -- The customer -- Government's dual role: customer and competitor -- Private sector view of government as customer -- The private sector suppliers -- Operation of the quasi-market -- Conclusions -- 7. Comparing public and contracted prisons -- 8. Comparing quality of service -- Methodological and data issues -- Home Office studies of four 'management only' contracted prisons -- National Audit Office study of the operational performance of PFI prisons -- HM Inspectorate ratings -- Statistical analysis by HMIP (2009) -- NOMS Prison Rating System (PRS) |
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The Cambridge research -- Comparison of quality at male local prisons -- Prisons in trouble -- Financial penalties -- Conclusions -- Four prisons in trouble -- 9. Costing the uncostable? Civil Service pensions -- The elephant in the room -- The question -- The Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme -- Benchmarks -- Does it really matter? -- Conclusions -- 10. Costing the uncostable? PFI -- PFI in prisons -- Criticisms of PSCs -- Length of PFI contracts and value for money -- Comparison with PFI in other services -- The Mouchel study -- Thameside PFI -- The end of PFI -- Conclusions -- 11. Comparing cost -- Some general issues about comparing costs -- 'Management only' contracts (new builds) -- Market tests -- PFIs versus PSCs: the data -- Construction: cost and speed -- Structure of the difference in operational cost between sectors -- Cost versus quality -- Can the public sector match private sector costs? -- Conclusions -- 12. Impact of competition on the public sector -- 1990: the Prison Service as basket case -- Extent of improvement 1990-2010 -- What drove this improvement? -- Scotland revisited -- Innovation -- Innovation in the contracted sector -- Innovation in the public sector -- Barriers to innovation -- Conclusions -- 13. Objections of principle -- Bad in principle, or bad in practice? -- 'Punishment is the preserve of the State' -- What are the requirements for adequate control, accountability and transparency? -- 'Immoral to make a profit out of suffering' -- 'Driving increased incarceration' -- Competition means a race to the bottom -- What the public -- and prisoners -- think -- The contrarian position: monopoly is immoral -- Conclusions -- 14. Related markets: probation -- how not to do it -- Seeing off competition -- Kenneth Clarke's proposals, 2012 -- Grayling and 'Transforming Rehabilitation' -- Proposed reinvestment |
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Failure to cost programme -- The organisational model for the new system is untried, over-complex and highly risky -- Uncertainty and risk about PBR -- Doubts about competence -- Dealing with failure -- Approach to risk -- Comparison with competition in prisons -- First inspection reports -- Conclusion -- 15. Has competition worked? -- Has competition been worthwhile? -- How well has government managed competition? -- Mistakes, mis-steps and missed opportunities -- 16. Has competition a future? -- The end of competition? -- No difference between sectors? -- The new contractual model -- Competition can be reintroduced at any time to deal with any failing public sector prison -- Why competition matters -- Conclusion -- Wider reflections -- Appendix: Prescription of operating procedures in prison contracts -- Bibliography -- Index |
| Summary |
This book re-assesses the benefits and failures of competition, how public and private prisons compare, the impact of competition on the public sector's performance, and how well Government has managed this 'quasi-market' |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Notes |
In English |
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Online resource; title from PDF title page (EBSCO, viewed December 21, 2015) |
| Subject |
Prisons -- Great Britain
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Privatization -- Great Britain
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Corrections -- Contracting out -- Great Britain
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SOCIAL SCIENCE -- Penology.
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SOCIAL SCIENCE -- Criminology.
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Corrections -- Contracting out
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Prisons
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Privatization
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Great Britain
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| ISBN |
9781447313236 |
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1447313232 |
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9781447313243 |
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1447313240 |
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