| Description |
1 online resource (16 pages : color illustrations (digital, PDF file)) |
| Series |
Best practices in counterinsurgency ; no. 2 |
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Best practices in counterinsurgency ; no. 2
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| Notes |
in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, growing indigenous security forces -- military, paramilitary police, and local police -- is not an activity that can be understood separate from the overall counterinsurgency strategy. Rather, the effort to grow indigenous security forces is nested within the conduct of offensive and defensive operations to secure the population, attacking insurgents and their networks, improving local-through-national governance capabilities, bringing selected insurgents into the political process, and expanding economic opportunities. Governmental legitimacy emerges over time and, like reconciliation, is facilitated by improved security and better indigenous security forces. The whole is often greater than the sum of its parts. A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy is such a whole, and 1 should not expect that any of its parts alone can do the job of the whole |
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December 2009 |
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Title from title screen (viewed Feb. 14, 2010) |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references |
| Notes |
Mode of access: World Wide Web |
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System requirements: Adobe Reader |
| Subject |
Afghanistan National Security Forces
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| SUBJECT |
Afghanistan National Security Forces. fast (OCoLC)fst01775601 |
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Afghan War (2001- ) fast (OCoLC)fst01695175 |
| Subject |
Afghan War, 2001-
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Counterinsurgency
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Internal security -- Afghanistan
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Police training -- Afghanistan
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Police -- Afghanistan
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Postwar reconstruction -- Afghanistan
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Soldiers -- Training of -- Afghanistan
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Counterinsurgency.
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Internal security.
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Police training.
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Police.
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Postwar reconstruction.
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Soldiers -- Training of.
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Afghanistan.
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| Form |
Electronic book
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| Author |
Institute for the Study of War (Washington, D.C.)
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