Julian Staben examines chilling effects, framed as deterrence-based lines of argument, in the jurisprudence of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) and compares them with the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court. Chilling effects follow distinct patterns when it comes to online behaviour and emerging digital practices and therefore call for their constitutional reassessment. Julian Staben's work enables a more methodologically reflective use of these arguments in the judicial discourse
Analysis
Bundesverfassungsgericht
Chilling effects
Comparative law
Constitutional & administrative law
German Federal Constitutional Court
Jurisprudence
LAB
LAM
LAW016000
LAW017000
LAW018000
LAW051000
LAW052000
LAW075000
LAW089000
LBG
LND
Philosophy of law
Political Science
Theory of law
US Supreme Court
Notes
Knowledge Unlatched 101762
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