| Description |
x, 229 pages ; 24 cm |
| Contents |
1. What are the options? -- pt. 1. Catching the contributory -- 2. Contributory reasons -- 3. Beyond favouring -- 4. Dropping the catch -- pt. 2. From holism to particularism -- 5. Holism and its consequences -- 6. Can holism be true? -- 7. Competing pictures -- 8. Knowing reasons -- pt. 3. Holism in the theory of value -- 9. Intrinsic and extrinsic value -- 10. Are there organic unities? -- 11. Rationality, value, and meaning -- 12. Principles of rational valuing |
| Summary |
“The author presents a long awaited exposition and defence of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. He traditional link between morality and principles, or between being moral and having principles, is little more than a mistake. The possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. Dancy grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining that moral reasons are no different in this respect from others. He puts forward a distinctive form of value-holism to go with the holism of reasons, and he gives a detailed discussion of the currently popular topic of contributory reasons. Opposing positions of all sorts are summarized and criticized.” -- BOOK JACKET |
| Notes |
Ook verschenen als online resource |
| Bibliography |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [216]-224) and index |
| Subject |
Holism.
|
|
Ethics.
|
|
Principle (Philosophy)
|
| Author |
Oxford University Press.
|
| LC no. |
2004303051 |
| ISBN |
0199270023 |
|
